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Abstract 
Semantic Networks have long been recognised as an important tool for natural 
language processing. This research has been a formal analysis of a semantic network 
using constructive type theory. 
The particular net studied is SemNet, the internal knowledge representation 
for LOLITA 1 : a large scale natural language engineering system. SemNet has been 
designed with large scale, efficiency, integration and expressiveness in mind. I t 
supports many different forms of plausible and valid reasoning, including: epistemic 
reasoning, causal reasoning and inheritance. 
The unified theory of types (UTT) integrates two well known type theories, 
Coquand-Huet's (impredicative) calculus of constructions and Martin-Lof's (pred-
icative) type theory. The result is a strong and expressive language which has been 
used for formalization of mathematics, program specification and natural language. 
Motivated by the computational and richly expressive nature of UTT, this re-
search has used it for formalization and semantic analysis of SemNet. Moreover, 
because of applications to software engineering, type checkers/proof assistants have 
been built. These tools are ideal for organising and managing the analysis of Sem-
Net. 
The contribution of the work is twofold. First the semantic model built has 
led to improved and deeper understanding of SemNet. This is important as many 
researchers that work on different aspects of LOLITA, now have a clear and un-
ambigious interpertation of the meaning of SemNet constructs. The model has 
also been used to show soundess of the valid reasoning and to give a reasonable 
semantic account of epistemic reasoning. Secondly the research contributes to NLE 
generally, both because it demonstrates that UTT is a useful formalization tool and 
that the good aspects of SemNet have been formally presented. 
Large-scale, Object based, Linguistic Interactor, Translator and Analyser 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The subject of this research is knowledge representation (KR) for natural language 
engineering (NLE). More specifically how to reason about such representations in a 
formal manner. This introductory chapter is in two parts. The first part discusses 
methodological issues and assumptions. The general class of problems within which 
this research fits, and how, in general, success should be measured is described. The 
second part describes the specific problem addressed by this work, how it fits into 
the general class of problems and more specific success criteria are given. 
1.1 Methodology 
1.1.1 Natural Language Engineering 
The building of large scale natural language systems involves the integration of 
a wide range of techniques and knowledge. In this respect it is a major task of 
engineering [Grishman, 1986], [Garigliano, 1995], [Smith, 1995], and hence the 
term NLE. It is clearly related to natural language processing, but differs, in the 
emphasis given to, or recognition of the need for, an engineering approach. 
The objective is to engineer products which deal with natural language and 
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which satisfy the constraints in which they have to operate. This distinguishes 
the work from many works in computational linguistics which often emphasise 
investigating (i.e. verifying or falsifying) a particular linguistic theory. 
[Nettleton, 1997c] outlines the major principles of NLE, for example, use of 
cost-benefit analysis, account taken of scale and resources, robustness, flexibility, 
openness and efficiency. In most cases these do not differ much from 'classical' 
engineering principles (as applied to, say, mechanical, civil or software engineering). 
The point in stating them is that it is felt they are often ignored in the field of 
NLP. 
The starting point for an NLE project is the objective. This work is done under 
the umbrella of a larger NLE project, the objective of which is to build a core system 
with natural language competence, capable of supporting many different domains 
and applications. It is an assumption of this work that to do this requires the 
design of a KR language, used to represent 'knowledge'1 of the 'real' 2 world devoid 
of linguistic aspects. 
The solution to this NLE problem involves providing core mechanisms for re-
trieving and reasoning about the knowledge, and providing core mechanisms for 
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Figure 1.1: Core NLE system for various applications. 
Natural language products are built from the core either by using the core 
x The K R is considered as being used by an agent. Here, knowledge represents a set of state-
ments, which this agent believes. 
2 Real in the sense that the agent using the representation believes it to be real 
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mechanisms or by interfacing with the KR directly. These requirements demand 
that the KR should be designed to: 
1. be expressive enough for the applications. This varies between applications. 
The basic requirement is for first order quantification, but representations for 
time, location, causality and belief may also be required. 
2. allow efficient conversion to and from natural language. The main work here 
is in applying techniques from the appropriate fields of parsing, semantic 
analysis, and generation. This is helped though if there is a clear relationship 
between linguistic structures and structures of the KR. 
3. allow efficient and robust retrieval and inference of 'knowledge'. There are 
likely to be many types of inference, some used more often than others. The 
design should exploit this and be efficient in such cases. 
4. be flexible enough to cope with different applications. This is tied to reuse 
and efficiency. I f similar or related 'knowledge' is required for different tasks, 
i t would be useful if they could both access the same structure in the way they 
need to. A less flexible representation may require duplicating the knowledge 
for each task. 
5. be easily understood by developers working with i t . This is key for developers 
of the core system but is also important when applications are built. 
1.1.2 Semantic Formalisation 
Formal semantics are provided by a mapping A4 between two structures. 
M : X i—> y 
X, often referred to as the syntactic or object language, is the language being 
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analysed, y, often referred to as the semantic language, usually has properties or 
structures which allow aspects of syntax (as interpreted by A4) to be analysed. 
The syntactic language will usually have identifiable well formed formulae (wff's) 
and rules of inference or operations which define how new wff's can be derived from 
given ones, thus defining proof within the language. The semantic language will 
have some notion of truth so that the well formed formulae of the syntax map to 
statements that are either true or false in the semantics. 
Definition 1.1 (Soundness) A syntactic theory is sound with respect to its se-
mantics if all provable formulae map to true statements in the semantics. 
Definition 1.2 (Completeness) A syntactic theory is complete with respect to 
its semantics if all true statements in the semantics are provable in the syntax. 
If a theory is sound then proofs in the syntax are well founded (at least as far 
as the semantic language is well founded). I f the theory is also complete then proof 
can be equated with truth. 
A useful and well known example is J-OVC which is usually interpreted into set 
theory [Davis, 1989]. This interpretation is not often challenged and so probably 
fits with most users' intuition of the meaning of J-OVC. Set theory is a well 
established mathematical theory and so showing the rules of inference to be sound 
and complete with respect to its interpretation is a meaningful result. 
For this work, the syntactic language is the KR used in the parent project. This 
in turn means that the analysis and results will mainly be applicable to the parent 
project. However, the KR used does have similarities with a large proportion 
of other KRs. Moreover, the KR used is felt (informally) to meet many of the 
requirements for NLE listed above. Therefore the work will contribute to the field 
more generally by interpreting and analysing aspects and structures that are used 
by many representations and by showing, formally, how the KR achieves the above 
requirements. 
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The choice of semantic language will be determined by the following require-
ments: 
1. 'Correctness' of reasoning results are required. This demands that the se-
mantic language should be a well founded mathematical theory. 
2. The language must be expressive enough to represent what the KR can rep-
resent. Ideally this should be done using standard features of the semantic 
language. 
3. Because the KR is used as part of a large-scale engineering project (rather 
than, say a cognitive modelling project), it will be useful if the theory can 
assist in analysis and design of the KR. 
Finally i t should be noted that one of the principles of NLE is the appropriate 
use of the wide range of techniques that have been established in this field. This 
principle means that in many cases the 'semantics' or behaviour cannot be captured 
by a single simple theory. This is thought to be similar to natural language itself 
which is extremely difficult to pin down as a single theory (as many linguists and 
philosophers have found). This work aims for a framework theory which captures 
the way the basic mechanisms work and can account for many of the rich aspects 
of the KR in a coherent manner. 
1.1.3 Methodological Success Criteria 
The criteria given here are general and apply to any instance of the class of problems 
described so far. They are used as a starting point for the specific success criteria 
for this research, described in section 1.2.2. 
A Formal Semantic model must be built 
This will consist of: 
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• A formal syntactic definition for the KR. This should encompass what forms 
a legal w f f , which subset of legal w f f s are in the KR, and how further w f f s 
can be infered from the KR. 
® A semantic domain, where each wff wil l have a semantic denotation. 
Robustness of reasoning requires that the rules (for valid reasoning) should be 
proven sound. To fully characterise the "inference" will also require completeness. 
Without this there will be statements which are entailed (according to the seman-
tics), but which cannot be deduced using the syntactic rules. 
KR's often provide plausible reasoning rules and heuristics. Soundness and 
completeness will not be relevant to these. 
Improved Understanding of the K R 
The model built should improve the understanding of the KR. I t is expected that 
the model should fit broadly with the intuitions of the KR developers and users. If it 
does not, then, improved understanding will come from analysing the discrepancy. 
Assuming the model fits with the broad intuition of the KR developers and 
users, then the model will provide an unambiguous, formal way of understanding 
the KR. I t will be used as a tool to investigate any properties claimed of the KR, 
in this case: 'expressiveness', 'closeness to natural language', and 'flexibility'. 
Generalising the results 
Performing a formalisation of this size is a major task which is relevant to other 
NLE projects, therefore the methods and tools used will be of interest. 
Secondly, assuming the KR has similarities with other representations, mod-
elling i t will be of interest to these similar representations. 
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1.2 LOLITA and SemNet 
This research is performed as part of the LOLITA 3 research programme. LOLITA 
is a computer program built using natural language engineering principles. The 
aim of the project is to develop a core system capable of supporting a variety of 
natural language products [Garigliano et ai, 1993b], [Morgan et al, 1995], [Smith, 
1995]. 
The KR of LOLITA is a graphical representation, SemNet. SemNet shares 
many similarities with semantic networks [Lehmann, 1992]. Nodes and arcs of 
SemNet correspond to concepts and relationships. There are nodes for 'entities' 
and 'events' and they are organised into a hierarchy. 
There are constructs for representing quantification, time and location, epis-
temic knowledge, events and causality. There are no primitive nodes and 'intu-
itively' the meaning of a node is defined by its relationship with other nodes. The 
full meaning of a node is only defined by the whole network. 
1.2.1 The L O L I T A architecture 
In the operation of LOLITA, SemNet is used in many ways and each module makes 
assumptions about the meaning of sub-structures of SemNet (and to interpret the 
ful l meaning requires traversal of the ful l graph). 
Figure 1.2 shows the architecture of the core of the LOLITA system and how 
some of its applications are built. 
1. The Inference Engine. The inference engine retrieves and infers 'knowl-
edge' contained in SemNet [Nettleton, 1997a]. The basic engine performs 
valid 4 inference, based mainly on inheritance. There are also modules for 
3Large scale, Object based, Linguistic Interpreter, Translator and Analyser 
4 A t least it is intended to be valid, of course an aim for this work is to show more formally 
that it is valid. 
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Figure 1.2: LOLITA architecture. 
plausible reasoning about epistemic knowledge and by analogy. 
2. Syntactic Analysis. Syntactic analysis corresponds to modules text pre-
processing, morphological analysis, parsing and normalisation in figure 1.2. 
The combined modules transform free text into parse trees [Nettleton, 1997a]. 
The basic parser produces a large number of possible parse trees and there is 
a system of features and penalties which discard syntactically unlikely results. 
Normalisation removes redundant parse trees by converting them to normal 
forms (e.g. converting passive to active, dative to non-dative, and filling in 
implicit missing phrases). 
3. Semantic Analysis Semantic analysis converts parse trees into SemNet 
structure [Short, 1996]. This means mapping the grammatical structures 
of the trees onto SemNet nodes. This involves determining if a node al-
ready exists in the network, and if it doesn't then also building i t . This in 
turn requires search and inference (i.e. the inference engine) and an implicit 
interpretation of the meaning of constructs of SemNet. 
Once built, pragmatic analysis [Nettleton, 1997a] and a source control system 
[Bokma and Garigliano, 1992] are applied to see i f the new knowledge should 
be accepted and with what level of belief. 
4. Generation The role of generation is to convert SemNet structure into natu-
ral language. Because there is no surface linguistic information the generator 
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has to make many decisions about 'how' to realise statements. 
Since each node is defined by the whole network, to 'realise' a node fully 
requires the whole of SemNet to be used. Indeed the whole of SemNet is 
passed as an argument to the generator [Smith, 1995]. However, clearly 
decisions have to be made about how much of a concept should be stated, 
and this in turn makes assumptions about the meaning of subsections of 
SemNet. These decisions are handled by the generator. 
5. Applications The core LOLITA system has been applied in many situations 
[Nettleton, 1997b] including Chinese tutoring [Wang, 1995], dialogue [Jones 
and Garigliano, 1994], template filling [Costantino et ai, 1996], database 
interfaces [Garigliano et ai, 1995] and content scanning [Garigliano et al., 
1993a]. 
The applications shown in figure 1.2 (database interfacing and template f i l l -
ing) both take 'knowledge' from SemNet and convert it accordingly. The 
same assumptions about interpretations of subsections of SemNet as used in 
generation are applied by these modules. 
1.2.2 SemNet principles and features 
SemNet is a graphical representation language. Nodes represent concepts and arcs 
represent relationships between them. There are nodes which represent entities 
and events. The events correspond to statements or propositions, and can be 
referred to just as any other nodes can. From now on this will be referred to as 
the Propositions as nodes principle. It is a principle that there are no pre-defined 
nodes in SemNet. The meaning of any node is determined by its relationship with 
other nodes/concepts, i.e. by its location, and consequently is only fully defined 
when the whole network has been interpreted. From now on this will be known 
as the meaning as location principle. Al l the nodes are organised into a hierarchy 
which allows for reasoning by inheritance. 
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The representation is free from linguistic styles and features. It has been de-
signed using engineering principles to support the objectives of LOLITA. There is 
no claim, or attempt to model cognitive behaviour. 
The above architecture description has shown that SemNet and its intuitive 
semantics are fundamental to LOLITA. This means that there are many subjective 
views of the 'meaning' of SemNet structures, which can lead to incorrect assump-
tions and code. 
Formal semantics will remove this subjectivity and improve the general under-
standing of SemNet. Furthermore a formal model will allow formal analysis of some 
of the features which, in section 1.1, were said to be required of a KR for NLE. 
For example, flexibility was listed as a key requirement. Clearly SemNet is being 
used in many different ways throughout the LOLITA system, and so intuitively 
must be flexible. By providing formal semantics it should be possible to add some 
formality to this concept. 
I t is outside the remit of this thesis to try to implement changes to LOLITA 
based on the results of this work. The aim is quite specifically to understand what 
is there and to make suggestions based on theoretical analysis. Decisions to change 
LOLITA can then be made based on both the theory and pragmatic (engineering) 
considerations. 
1.2.3 Project Aims and success criteria 
This section takes the general criteria given in section 1.1.3 and makes them specific 
to this research. 
Build a formal semantic model of SemNet 
This must include: 
• A syntactic definition of SemNet 
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To analyse the reasoning procedures there must be a clear definition of what 
constitutes a legal SemNet, which syntactic structures form legal w f f s , how 
it is determined which w f f s are in a SemNet and what rules can be applied 
to allow new w f f s to be 'infered' from a SemNet. 
To allow analysis of concepts such as: 'closeness to natural language', 'flexibil-
ity ' , and 'meaning as location1 it will be necessary to clearly identify 'syntactic 
substructures' which combine to form the w f f s . 
• Semantic Domain and Denotations 
An appropriate semantic domain must be given. This domain must have 
a mathematical foundation which can be 'trusted'. I t must also be expres-
sive enough analyse structures purporting to represent a significant subset of 
natural language. 
Each syntactic structure should have a semantic denotation, and each wff 
should be interpretable as either true or false. 
Meta theoretic results 
The valid reasoning is mainly based on inheritance. The inheritance algorithms are 
used in various guises throughout the core. Therefore it is extremely important to 
show that inferences drawn are indeed valid. A soundness proof will provide this 
(relative to the semantic domain). 
To show that the semantics fully characterise the valid reasoning wil l require 
a completeness proof. Whilst this will help understanding i t is not as useful as a 
soundness proof, and also might not be possible. 
Investigate the 'good features' of SemNet 
• SemNet structure is close to natural language structure 
To test this a comparison between the interpretation for different aspects of 
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SemNet and formal semantics for the 'equivalent' natural language statement 
will be performed. As discussed in 1.3 this is not entirely satisfactory because 
there is no agreed formal semantics for natural language and the usage of 
'equivalent' is quite vague. However, a crude analysis should be possible. 
• Meaning as Location 
Is an interpreted node only fully defined when the whole network has been in-
terpreted, and is the manner in which 'meaning' are built in SemNet reflected 
in the model. 
• Show how SemNet represents complex expressions. 
It is claimed that SemNet can express and reason about epistemic knowledge, 
i.e., statements about LOLITA's own beliefs and statements about other 
agents beliefs. Also that sentences with complex anaphora and quantification 
can be represented. 
To show 'how' SemNet represents complex expressions it must first be es-
tablished that it can represent such expressions. To do this they must of 
course be representable in the semantic language. To test that the meanings 
really have been captured the inferences and consequences of such statements 
should be shown to follow. 
To go further and show 'how' SemNet is representing this knowledge there 
must be a similarity of structure between SemNet and the semantic language. 
This will be judged subjectively again based on a comparison with natural 
language semantics and the subjective opinions of LOLITA's designers. 
• Show flexibility of SemNet 
From the description given, it is clear that SemNet is being used in many 
ways, and so is presumably flexible. A successful result will be a formal 
property of the representation that shows iP/how it can be used in these 
5 I n the case where there is a theoretical problem with the different ways modules use SemNet, 
the property should be able to highlight this problem. 
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different ways. 
Improve developer comprehend-abil i ty 
A final measure of usefulness to the LOLITA project is to see how useful the 
semantics are for designing and using SemNet, i.e. will the designers use the model 
or will they continue to use their intuitive interpretations. 
Extract aspects of the formalisation relevant to N L E 
As will be discussed in chapter 2, there has been a lack of formal descriptions 
for semantic networks. Therefore this work will already contribute to the wider 
community by showing that such formalisations can be done, and that doing so 
develops intuition. It is thought that there are aspects of SemNet which are useful 
for NLE. It is thought that the formalisation will show why this is the case, e.g. 
how i t represents complex expressions and how it achieves flexibility. 
If the formalisation is successful then there will be some value in examining the 
methods and tools used to perform the evaluation. 
1.3 Logical Progression of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews related work. A brief review of research issues in semantic 
networks is given. After this a critical review of the formal approaches taken for 
modelling and reasoning about these networks is given. Aspects of networks which 
are similar to, or held by SemNet are highlighted. 
Chapter 3 gives an overview of constructive type theory. The chapter works 
chronologically ending with Luo's UTT [Luo, 1994], which is the version of type 
theory used for the formalisation. Type theory has many applications in computer 
science and because of this many tools and techniques (such as machine assisted 
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proof development, and modular reasoning) have been developed which can be 
used to help manage a formalisation task such as this one. A review of the work of 
Ranta [Ranta, 1994] is also given, which shows how constructive type theory has 
aspects for analysing and reasoning about natural language directly. 
Chapter 4 is a detailed description of the principles and design of SemNet. 
Although placed before the 'semantic model' chapters i t is considered a part of the 
contribution of the thesis. The issues raised and the clearness of the description only 
came as a result of the formal analysis described in later chapters. An informal 
discussion of the good aspects (for KR and NLE) is given. The later chapters 
formalise these aspects further. 
Chapter 5 follows the methods of other researchers in building a semantic 
model using classical techniques such as set theory and possible world semantics. 
Many of the 'correctness' problems can be addressed by this model. However, i t is 
argued that there are problems in manageability and differences in structure which 
limit the usefulness of this model. 
Chapter 6 describes the framework of the type theoretic formalisation. A 
description of how the tools and techniques developed for type theory are used is 
given. Soundness results for valid reasoning and a discussion of how 'similar' the 
model can be made. A further aspect is that since type theory is a programming 
language an analysis of the implementation can also be given. Finally a discussion 
of the usage of Lego (a proof assistant based on type theory) is given. 
Chapter 7 concentrates on showing the similarity in structure between SemNet 
and the type theoretic semantic model. Specific issues addressed are a better 
coverage of intensionality and complex quantification sentences. 
Chapter 8 starts with an evaluation based on the criteria of section 1.3. Final 
conclusions are drawn and a discussion of possible further work is given. 
Chapter 2 
Formal Semantics for Semantic 
Networks 
This chapter begins with a short history of semantic networks and concludes with 
networks that are similar to SemNet. An overview of general research themes and 
a more detailed coverage of three well known network representations is given. The 
review concentrates on work related to formal understanding of network represen-
tations. Each system covered is compared with the main principles of SemNet. 
2.1 Issues in Semantic Networks for N L E 
Semantic networks with the meaning as location principle, date back to Quillan's 
work in the 60's [Luger and Stubblefield, 1993] pp 360. English words were defined 
(like a dictionary) in terms of other words (words being nodes in a network) and 
the meaning rather than involving primitives is defined by its location. A user 
determines the meaning of a word by traversing the (perhaps circular) graph until 
they are satisfied that they have understood the meaning of the original word. 
This early work established ideas such as 'labelled arcs', hierarchical inheritance 
and inference by graph traversal. Since then many systems have been defined and 
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implemented with a variety of definitions and principles [Lehmann, 1992]. They 
have been popular for NLP research since they are more readable and intuitive 
than classical logic, and (seemingly) richly expressive and efficient. A continuing 
theme is the need for formal semantics for these different schemas [Woods, 1975] 
[Woods, 1991]. 
[Schubert, 1991] makes a call for a recognition of the fact that most networks (if 
not all) are merely notational variants of first order logic. However, it is accepted 
that networks organise 'knowledge' to allow certain types of inference procedure 
(i.e. inheritance) to be performed efficiently. It is a claim of this work that networks 
can also be organised to allow certain types expressions to be easily stated, and/or 
more flexibly available than first order logic, (both of which are specifically required 
by NLE). SemNet fits this category and formalisation will help to show the essence 
of the 'organisation' needed to achieve the required behaviour. 
2.1.1 Defeasible Inheritance 
Many inheritance based network representations have developed schemes and rules 
for handling defeasible inheritance. Defeasible inheritance allows plausible infer-
ences to be drawn. Consider the following example1: from the inheritance network 
in figure 2.1 it can be inferred that: 
1. Tweety is a bird and so can fly. 
2. Tweety is a penguin and so cannot fly. 
The immediate reaction to this is to consider that the network is inconsistent, 
and so useless. The problem is that the first conclusion, although invalid, is in 
many cases plausible and useful to draw. Many inheritance systems resolve this 
by allowing both conclusions to stand, but that i f they both appear, the inference 
: The bird/penguin problem appears many times in the literature and is a standard way to 
present the defeasible inheritance problem. 
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ANIMALS 
'a kind or link 
t*- 'isa' link 
BIRDS (GENERALLY CAN FLY) 
inherited 'isa' link 
PENGUINS (CANNOT FLY) 
e. ' 
TWEETY 
Figure 2.1: The Bird/Penguin problem 
based on the most specific information would stand. In this case, since being a 
penguin is more specific than being a bird, the second conclusion would stand. 
There has been much research both formalising this type of reasoning [Touret-
zky, 1986], [Fahlman, 1979], and relating it to non-monotonic logics [Etherington, 
1988] [Froidevaux and Kayser, 1988] [Shastri, 1988]. SemNet does not use such 
formulations for plausible reasoning [Long and Garigliano, 1994] and so such works 
are not yet relevant to this research. 
2.2 K L - O N E 
As has already been mentioned, Woods [Woods, 1975] made a call for a more formal 
description of network constructs. For example, it should be made clear whether 
the graph shown in figure 2.2 is making the assertion 'telephones are black, or i f is 
defining the concept of black telephones. 
B L A C K -* T E L E P H O N E 
Figure 2.2: 'Black telephones' or ' A l l telephones are black' 
Brachman [Brachman and Schmolze, 1985], in part response to this, developed 
his theory of structured inheritance (SI) nets. This theory was adopted by the 
KL-ONE project for natural language understanding. 
To explain the theory of KL-ONE it is first necessary to explain frame based 
systems [Luger and Stubblefield, 1993]. A frame based system consists of data 
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structures organised into a hierarchy via ako (a kind of) and isa links. Data 
structures are added to the hierarchy manually. The semantics of the hierarchy 
is defined by the inheritance algorithms that operate on i t . There are no clearly 
specified criteria for when and where a structure could be added to the hierarchy. 
This meant that data had to be entered manually by a human expert, and worse 
still as the network becomes more complicated it becomes harder to understand all 
the ramifications of extending the network in a particular way. 
KL-ONE changed this by insisting that there should be a 'criterial semantics' for 
the structures of the hierarchy. The inheritance operations would then have to be 
justified with respect to these criterial semantics. This meant that concepts could 
be automatically classified into the hierarchy (KL-ONE was the first inheritance 
network to achieve this [Brachman et ai, 1991]). Later work went further than 
demanding criterial semantics and insisted on a model theoretic understanding for 
the language [Woods and Schmolze, 1992]. For the basic hierarchy of concepts and 
roles this was done by postulating a domain of individuals T>, and specifying an 
function 2 £ which maps concepts to subsets of T> and roles to subsets of V x V. The 
top concept mapped to D, and the top role to T> x T>. Basic concepts lower down 
the hierarchy are defined by a role, an existing concept and a quantification symbol. 
Such nodes are interpreted in terms of the interpretations of these concepts. For 
example, a new concept "(V, r, c)" is interpreted as: 
{x <E V | Vt/(z,y) € £(r) ->! /G £(c)}. 
Informally, the concept is defined as the set of objects that are in the role 'r' 
with all objects in 'c'. There is a problem with this formulation when there is a 
cyclic/recursive dependency between definitions, for example if the interpretation 
of 'c' were defined in terms of the concept (V, r, c). Nebel [Nebel, 1991] provides 
an analysis of different methods of providing semantics for this situation, including 
2 The function given is overloaded, in the sense that it takes objects of different types. 
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fixed point methods, but ends concluding none of the methods analysed is obviously 
superior. 
Later work maintained the importance of the distinction between definition 
and assertion. Indeed most KL-ONE systems are distinguished by having two 
separate knowledge bases: a terminology box (T-box) containing the hierarchy of 
concepts which make up the definitions of concepts, and an assertional box (A-box) 
usually made up of first order statements based on concepts defined in the T-box. 
Various papers have been published on the issue of how best to integrate the two 
types of knowledge: Frisch [Frisch, 1991] describes a substitutional framework in 
which the T-box is used to provide sortal information for the more standard first 
order theorem proving algorithms. Work based on the LILOG project [Herzog and 
Rollinger, 1991], argues that for natural language understanding applications data 
is often updated in both 'boxes' and so a closer coupling of information between 
the 'boxes' is needed [Beierle et a/., 1992]. 
There have been attempts to extend the basic KL-ONE language with modal 
statements. [Graber et a/., 1995], uses them to integrate knowledge and belief 
operators. For example, i f w f f is a statement (from either the T-box of the A-
box) then: 
aK aB, • w f f 
joe cans J J 
would represent the statement "(agent) joe knows that (agent) chris believes w f f " . 
This extension is given a Kripke style possible worlds semantics [Meyer and der 
Hoek, 1995]. Soundness and decidability of a reasoning algorithm are shown. 
2.2.1 K L - O N E and SemNet. 
There are many similarities between KL-ONE and SemNet. In particular the T-
box defines concepts in a manner similar to SemNet (in terms of its position in the 
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hierarchy and the events i t is involved in). Indeed there are very close similarities 
between the model described for KL-ONE and the set theoretic semantics given for 
SemNet 'entity' nodes in chapter 5. A problem with the SemNet model (and it is 
presumably also a problem for the KL-ONE model) is that the model is extensional 
and so does not distinguish 'intensionally' distinct concepts. 
A major difference is that in SemNet statements (both taxonomic and asser-
tional) are represented by nodes. These are used to represent epistemic assertions 
directly, which is quite different from adding modal operators. Nevertheless, a sim-
ilar style possible worlds semantics have been developed as an attempt to model 
these assertions. 
2.3 Conceptual Graph Theory 
Sowa [Sowa, 1984] introduced Conceptual Graph Theory (CGT) as a "natural" 
formalism for representing knowledge. Since then many researchers have used 
conceptual graphs as a starting point for knowledge based and natural language 
processing systems. Different problems and issues have led to a wide range of 
research [Nagle et ai, 1992] including: 
• Expressiveness. 
• Hierarchical reasoning. 
• Representing temporal knowledge. 
• Using CGT for NLP, i.e. parsing and semantics analysis into CGT, and 
generating free text from CGT. 
2.3.1 C G T basics 
The basic system can be viewed as a sorted version of the graphical logic of Charles 
Sanders Peirce. 
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PERSON:John -* ( A G N T ) - " G O ^ ( D E S T ^ 
( jNST^) 
Figure 2.3: CGT for 'John is going to Boston by bus' 
Concepts represented by rectangles (see figure 2.3) map to monadic (1-argument) 
predicates and concepts represented by ellipses map to relations with as many ar-
guments as there are arcs emanating from the corresponding node. The graph 
shown in figure 2.3 maps to the TOVC formula: 
3a:.3y person( John) A go(x) A city(Boston) A bus(y) 
/\agnt(x, John) A inst(x, y) A dest(x, Boston) 
There is a labelling system (labels on the concept) which allows concepts to 
be referred to in different ways. The concepts are organised into a type hierarchy, 
formally understood as a lattice. Types lower down the hierarchy are defined by 
A-abstractions over types higher up. There has been work addressing reasoning on 
the type hierarchy and how to couple the definitional and assertional information 
which is connected to the KL-ONE type research. 
CGT has a system of contexts, with a context representing a situation as in the 
situation calculus [Barwise and Perry, 1985]. The contexts can represent negation, 
modality and epistemic relations. 
2.3.2 C G T formal aspects 
The basic logic of CGT is isomorphic to TOVC. It therefore shares the same (set 
theoretic) semantics and is sound and complete. The concept hierarchy is seen as 
adding sorts to the language, which, as shown by Walther [Walther, 1987], can 
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significantly improve the efficiency of inference. I n C G T the hierarchy is defined 
intensionally (through A abstractions) but there seems to be no formal semantic 
modelling of this aspect. 
The system of contexts is based on the situation calculus, but again there seems 
to be no formal interpretation of constructs in to this language 
2.3.3 CGT and SemNet. 
There are many aspects of C G T which are similar to SemNet. For example, the 
type hierarchy being defined by definitions is similar to SemNet. Moreover, since 
they are defined by A abstractions, an obvious continuation is to model concepts 
as types (see next chapter). 
The system of contexts is quite different f r o m SemNet which i f adopted, as 
discussed in section 4.5, would break distributedness. Since i t is based on the 
situation calculus, this is clearly the semantic language which should be used to 
understand i t . However, this does not mean that situation calculus w i l l be the best 
tool to model the epistemic aspects of SemNet. 
A f inal difference between the languages is that C G T reflects linguistic structure 
more closely by using separate items to refer to the same concept (i.e. to model 
anaphora). This is done using a system of co-reference links (drawn as broken 
lines) which show when two apparently different nodes, actually refer to the same 
concept. 
2.4 SNePS 
SNePS (for Semantic Network Processing System) [Shapiro and Rapaport, 1987], 
[Shapiro, 1979], is a semantic network language w i t h facilities for building semantic 
networks. There are fur ther facilities for retrieving and inferring information f r o m 
the networks. Users can interact w i t h SNePS in a variety of ways including an 
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extendible fragment of English. I t has been used in many applications including 
cognitive modelling and computational linguistics. 
2.4.1 SNePS basics and principles. 
The first principle of SNePS is that i t is a propositional network [Kumar and 
Chalupsky, 1993]. This means that al l information, including propositions are 
represented by nodes. I n K L - O N E propositions were represented by formulae, and 
in CGT by 'proposition contexts'. 
There is a principle that unique concepts are represented by unique nodes. This 
means that nodes represent intensional objects. 
SNePS s y n t a x . 
Nodes are structured by the arcs which emanate f r o m them. They are divided into 
atomic nodes (no arcs emanating f r o m them and so they have no structure): 
• sensory nodes, which represent interfaces w i t h the real world. Typical ly words 
used in some language. 
• base nodes represent constant individuals. 
• variable nodes represent arbitrary individuals and propositions, 
and molecular (structured) nodes: 
• structured individuals 
e structured propositions. 
Figure 2.4 shows how SNePS builds up complex concepts. In tui t ively m9 rep-
resents the concept 'yellow' as indicated by its connection to the sensory node 
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SUPERCLASS 
o 
d. ^ Senwcy nodes. 
Figure 2.4: Example SNePS graph for concept 'a yellow dog'. 
'yellow'. m l 2 represents the concept 'an individual yellow dog' and can be referred 
to by other (propositional) nodes. 
There are various reasoning mechanisms based on this representation, including 
reduction and path based inference [Shapiro, 1991]. Bo th of these are described 
as modelling subconscious reasoning, since they allow v i r tua l arcs to be inferred, 
through the presence of others. For example, a M E M B E R arc can be inferred (by 
reduction) to ' v i r tua l ly ' occur between m l 2 and m l 6 in figure 2.4. This is basically 
inheritance, although i t is claimed that i t is more natural to consider them in this 
way. The reasoning mechanisms are given a set theoretic interpretation. 
A N A L O G 
A N A L O G (for A N A t u r a l LOGic) [Al i and Shapiro, 1993] extends the SNePS 
representation w i t h structured (molecular) variables. 
1 men | (MT} „ " ( v j ) [ roorti] | 
Figure 2.5: A N A L O G graph for ' A l l men are morta l ' . 
The node ' V I ' is a variable node, the all arc provides the quantification informa-
t ion. The representation is described as being close to natural language, providing 
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a direct mapping for anaphora (see the representation of the 'donkey sentence' in 
chapter 4) and being able to represent 'branching quantifiers' such as those involved 
in the sentence: "Some relative of each villager and some relative of each townsman 
hate each other. 
2.4.2 Formal semantics for SNePS 
The semantics of SNePS are mainly based on Meinongian's theory of objects [Ra-
paport, 1981]. A Meinongian object is an object of thought. To give an example, 
taken f r o m [Rapaport, 1981], 
Suppose, e.g. I am th inking that the person in the next room is happy. 
I f there is not such a person, then I am thinking at most of a Meinongian 
object; i f there is such a person, then there is - in addit ion - an actual 
object. ... Let us say that actual objects "exemplify" properties while 
Meinongian objects are "constituted" by properties. 
I t is held that any ' th ing ' which is an object of language (e.g. noun phrases or 
sentences) must be an object of thought. [Shapiro and Rapaport, 1987] describes a 
mapping of the nodes of SNePS into Meinongian objects, thus bui lding up a formal 
intensional description of the network. 
The interpretation does not cover base nodes, which are presumably considered 
atomic. H i l l [H i l l , 1994] argues that base nodes should not be treated in this way. 
Indeed, an argument is presented which discusses how the 'meaning as location' 
principle of SNePS should be captured i n the semantics, and that base nodes both 
influence nodes that point to them and have intrinsic meaning themselves. A n 
elegant of interpretation these nodes as non well founded sets 3 [Aczel, 1988] is 
given. 
3 A modern version of set theory, which rejects the 'well founded' axiom and accepts sets that 
can be members of themselves. 
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2.4.3 SNePS and SemNet 
There are many similarities between SNePS and SemNet. Most pertinent is the 
proposition as nodes principle, which correspond directly w i th SemNet events. Also 
similar are the principles of uniqueness and 'meaning through location. 
SNePS has been designed to be cognitively realistic, rather than as an engi-
neering system. The semantics defined is used to understand the network f r o m 
this point of view. SemNet differs in being designed w i t h pragmatic and applica-
t ion relevant aspects (e.g. f lexib i l i ty and efficiency). I t is not clear how Meinong 
semantics could help in this endeavour. 
2 o 5 Review 
Semantic networks have a relatively long history i n art if icial intelligence, although 
their actual distinction f rom other knowledge representation languages (specifically 
first order logic) is disputed. Different versions w i t h different motivations have been 
bui l t , each sharing many underlying themes. 
Formal aspects and semantics have been applied in differing amounts to each 
of the main systems, and i t is through these that differences i n structure and 
assumptions become apparent. 
SemNet shares the underlying themes, and also has aspects i n common w i t h 
each of the main systems described. I t does have its own motivations and dis-
tinctions, which are discussed in detail in chapter 4. Nevertheless i t is clear that 
formal semantic analysis of SemNet is of wide interest to the semantic network 
community. 
Chapter 3 
Constructive Type Theory 
SemNet is formalised in the constructive type theory U T T (Unif ied Theory of 
Types). As discussed in chapter 1, U T T is used to define the syntax and semantics 
of SemNet. This chapter is a self contained introduction to constructive type theory 
and U T T which explains all the features relevant needed in this work. 
3 o l Introduction 
Type theory is first understood in terms of two universes, one of 'objects' and one 
of 'types'. A 'judgement' of type theory is a statement of the fo rm: 
a : A 
which should be read as 'object a is of type A ' . The simplest type constructor 
is the funct ion constructor — K Given two types A and B, a new type A —> B can 
be formed and its objects w i l l be functions that map objects of type A to objects 
of type B . 
Some principles of type theory (as i t is used here) are that 
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1. Every object has a unique type. 
For example, i f the object '4 ' is considered to be of type M (the type of 
natural numbers), then 4 cannot also be considered to be of type 71 (the type 
of rational numbers). 
2. Types are understood extensionally, i.e. i f two types are inhabited by the 
same objects then they are the same type. However, functions are intensional, 
in that they reflect the computational behaviour of the funct ion. 
This is different to set theory, where functions are represented by relations 
(i.e. extensional sets). 
The language is clearly more restrictive than set theory, which allows objects 
to be members of any number of sets. By being more restrictive i t becomes more 
manageable and so lends itself to many applications. 
3.1.1 Type Theory as a Programming Language 
The notion of computation is pr imi t ive i n type theory. Function types are inhabited 
by lambda abstractions. For example an object of type A -> B (the type of 
functions f rom objects of type A to object of type B) is an abstraction of the f o r m 
Xx : A.B. Computation is defined by /? reduction [Hindley and Seldin, 1986]. 
D e f i n i t i o n 3.1.1 (f3 r e d u c t i o n ) Any term of the form 
(Xx : A.M)N 
(with A a type and M and N terms) is called a redex. 
[N/x]M 
is called its contractum. 
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(\x : A.M)N >p [N/x]M 
defines 1-step j3 reduction. 
D e f i n i t i o n 3.1.2 ( C o m p u t a t i o n a l E q u a l i t y ) Computational equality is defined 
as the transitive, reflexive and symmetric closure of 1-step (3 reduction. 
A = B 
should be read as A is computationally equal to B. 
D e f i n i t i o n 3.1.3 ( C h u r c h - R o s s e r ) Any two computationally equal terms can be 
reduced to a common term: 
V M l 5 M 2 . ( M i S M 2 ) 3 M . ( M X > M) A ( M 2 > M) 
D e f i n i t i o n 3.1.4 ( S u b j e c t R e d u c t i o n ) Computation is type preserving. 
D e f i n i t i o n 3.1.5 ( N o r m a l f o r m ) A term is in normal form if and only if it 
contains no redexes, i.e. it can only compute to itself. 
D e f i n i t i o n 3.1.6 ( S t r o n g N o r m a l i s a t i o n ) Every computation starting from a 
well typed term terminates, i.e. reaches a normal form. 
Different formulations for type theories can be given (as described later i n this 
chapter). For each i t is extremely useful i f the above properties can be established 
as they w i l l lead to many desirable properties such as decidability, manageability 
and implementability. 
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3.1.2 Type Theory as a Logical Language 
A key turning point for type theory is the p r o p o s i t i o n as t y p e s principle, as 
discovered by Curry [Curry and Feys, 1958] and Howard [Howard, 1980]. 
The idea is that any proposition P corresponds to a type Pr f (P) , and a proof 
of P corresponds to an object of type Pr f (P) . 
For example, there is a correspondence between funct ion type symbol and the 
implicat ion symbol of ( intui t ionist ic) logic. I f A and B are types, then given objects 
of a : A and / : A —> B, an object of type f(a) of type B can be constructed. This 
coincides w i t h viewing A and B as propositions, a as a proof of A , f as a proof of 
A —>• B, and being able to derive (or construct) a proof of B. 
Again different formulations of type theory w i l l lead to different logics, w i t h 
fur ther consequences for decidability and manageability. 
3.1.3 The dependent type constructors 
Constructive type theory allows richer type constructors. Two important ones are 
the 'dependent product type' and the 'dependent strong sum type'. 
T h e d e p e n d e n t p r o d u c t t y p e 
The dependent product type has functions as objects. For a type A and any fami ly 
of types B[x] indexed by arbitrary objects x of type A, n x : A . B ( x ) is the type of 
functions ' f such that for any object a of type A , applying f to a yields an object 
of type B[a]. The te rm dependent is used since the type of the resulting object 
'depends' on the object the funct ion is applied to. In tui t ively i t represents the set 
of (dependent) functions f r o m A to B[x] : 
{ / | Va : A.f(a) : B[a}} 
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I f the resulting type is always the same, say B , for all objects a, then the funct ion 
type simplifies to the type A —> B. As an example of this concept, consider poly-
morphic functions for programming languages. The polymorphic equality funct ion 
Eq has type: 
Eq : I L 4 : Type.(A -> A -> bool) 
i.e. Eq takes a type as parameter and returns an equality funct ion for that 
type, but the type of this funct ion 'depends' on the type (object) passed. Here the 
parameter used to index the 'range' types is a type, but this need not be the case 
for dependent types. 
T h e S t r o n g S u m T y p e 
Strong sum types are types of pairs of objects. For any type A and any fami ly of 
types B[x] indexed by arbitrary object x of type A , Sx :A .B(x ) is the type of pairs 
(a,b) where a is an object of type A and b is of type B[a]. In tu i t ive ly i t represents 
the set of (dependent) pairs of elements of A and B[x] : 
{ ( a , b ) | a : A,b: B[a]} 
The projection functions 
T T I : (Ex : A.B(x)) -> A 
TT2 : I I z : (Ex : A.B(x)).B(irl(z)) 
extract the first and the second entry of a pair, respectively. For example, i f 
g : (Sx :A.B(x) ) , then (irl g) :A. Because of the inherent dependency they are useful 
for describing complex types. 
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3.1.4 Inductively Defined Types 
Types can be defined inductively. This is done by giving constructors to say how 
objects of this new type can be formed. By making the definition inductive we are 
saying that this is the only way in which canonical objects of this type can possibly 
be formed, for example, the three judgements: 
N Type 
0 N 
succ N ->• N 
defines the type of natural numbers. By definit ion, the rules define, exhaus-
tively, how objects of type N (natural numbers) may be constructed. Because the 
rules are exhaustive, an associated el imination rule can be inferred. 
Nelim : UC : N ^ Type. 
C ( 0 ) - > 
(Ux : N.C (x) -> C (succ (x))) ->• 
I l n : N (C (n)) 
This gives a method for defining functions that operate on all objects of the 
inductive type. For example, i n this case functions for addition, subtraction and 
mul t ip l ica t ion can be defined. This method can be used to prove theorems about 
this type N . I t turns out that Peano axioms can be proved for this type. 
3 . 2 Some versions of Constructive Type Theory 
There are different versions of constructive type theory. The main differences are 
reflected in the different structures of their conceptual universe of types. 
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3.2-1 Mart in-Lof ' s (predicative) type theory 
Perhaps the best known is Mart in-Lof ' s type theory [Mart in-Lof, 1984] [Nordstrom 
et a/., 1990]. This can be understood in a hierarchical way: one starts by intro-
ducing various basic types (e.g. f ini te types, and natural numbers), and using type 
constructors ( in this case the dependent types I I and £ ) , builds up more complex 
types, un t i l finally, one may introduce a type universe, which is the type consisting 
of (the names of ) each of the types so far introduced. Continuing in this way a 
sequence of type universes can be bui l t up Type(0) : T y p e ( l ) : Type(2) : ... There 
is not a type of all types, instead such a type is approximated by the (infinite) 
sequence of universes. 
I n this theory types are not distinguished f r o m propositions. Since there is not 
a type of all types i t is not possible to quant ify over all propositions (although 
quantification over any of the type universes is allowed). 
The theory has been used as a foundational language for constructive mathe-
matics [Bishop, 1967]. Universal quantification is represented by the H constructor 
and existential quantification by the £ constructor. This 'strong' notion of existen-
t ia l quantification ensures that an object can alway be extracted by the projection 
funct ion 7rl. For example, in mathematics the statement 
3n : N.Prime(n) A Even(n) 
is informally read as 'there exists a natural number which is both even and 
prime' . Whereas when the strong existential is used, i.e. 
Tin : N.Prime(n) A Even(n) 
the statement can only be realised (proved) by a pair of objects, one of which 
is a natural number and the other being a proof that this number is both prime 
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and even. For example, 
(2,Proof that 2 is even and prime) 
3.2.2 Impredicative type theory 
The above theory was predicative, i n that there is no type which allows quantifi-
cation over itself leading to the new object of the same type, i.e. no type T such 
that: 
(m : T.A) : T 
Such an idea is incorporated in the polymorphic types of some lambda calculus. 
P o l y m o r p h i c A-calculus 
The A-calculus in its original f o r m is untyped. Any te rm can be applied to any 
t e rm to derive a new object. This section discusses Church style typed systems 1. 
Type systems are distinguished by which constructors are allowed into the the-
ory. The simplest version of /am&G?a-calculus is A — K The only type constructor 
for this theory is —>. The type format ion rule is: 
r I - A : Type, T h B : Type 
Type formation 
r h ( A - ^ f l ) : Type 
and i t is defined by the following introduction and el imination rules: 
T\- M : ( S - > T ) t T h N : S 
—• -elimination 
r h (MN) : T 
*As opposed to Curry style type systems [Barendregt, 1992]. 
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T,x:S\-M:T 
-^--introduction 
r h {\x : S.M) : S -> T 
More generally functions are defined as the dependent product types. A new 
sort ' K i n d ' is introduced where Type resides, i.e. Type:Kind. General T y p e / K i n d 
format ion rules are of the f o r m : 
r h A : s i , T,x : A h B : s2 
Type/Kind formation 
r h ( ILr : A.B): s3 
where s i , s2 and s3 range over Type and K i n d . Allowing the various combina-
tions as rules leads to different theories (and their corresponding logics). Baren-
dregt [Barendregt, 1992] gives an elegant discussion of some of these systems show-
ing how they f o r m a cube of type systems, w i t h A —> at the base and the calculus 
of constructions at the peak, see figure 3.1. Each orthogonal direction represents 
the inclusion of one of the above format ion rules. 
For example A2 has the rule: 
r h A : Kind, T, x : A h B : Type 
r h (ILr : A.B) : Type 
This allows the judgement: 
(LTA : Type.A A) : Type 
and therefore introduces impredicativity. I t corresponds to the 2nd order typed 
A calculus [Girard, 1986]. 
AP adds the rule: 
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r h A : Type, T, x : A h B : A'ind 
T h (ILE : A . f i ) : / f i n d 
corresponds w i t h predicate logic and is used as the basis for the A U T O M A T H 
project [de B r u i j n , 1980]. 
\u adds the rule: 
r h A : Kind, T, x : A h B : Kind 





Figure 3.1: The A-cube. 
C o q u a n d - H u e t ' s calculus of construct ions 
I n the calculus of constructions (CC) there is a type Prop corresponding to the 
type of propositions (i.e. not all types are propositions). Furthermore this type is 
impredicative, e.g. H.P : Prop.P is also a proposition (object of type Prop). This 
allows for the notion of predicates and relations over types, e.g. Pred : A —> Prop 
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and Relation : A —> A —> Prop. The CC corresponds to the intuit ionist ic higher 
order predicate logic. Dependent funct ion types are present but the dependent sum 
type is not. 
3.2.3 Luo's E C C and U T T 
The Extended Calculus of Constructions (ECC) was developed in Luo's PhD thesis 
[Luo, 1990]. I t can be viewed as a unification of Mar t in-Lof ' s type theory and 
CC. ECC extends CC w i t h the notion of type universes and the £ type, and i t 
extends Mar t in-L"of ' s type theory by adding the impredicative type Prop, of logical 
propositions, inside the smallest type universe Type(0). 
The strong sum (E) type constructor does not reside in Prop. Al lowing i t to do 
so would cause the logic to become inconsistent. Instead the existential quantifier 
is defined in terms of the other primitives. 
The usual logical operators are defined as (following the usual formulat ion for 
second order logic connectives as functions [Leviant, 1994]): 
Vz : A.P(x) =def Tlx : A.P(x) 
P ^ Q —def \ f x : P.Q 
true =def VX : Prop.(X -+ X ) 
false =def \/X : Prop.X 
PAQ =def VX : Prop.{P ^ Q ^ X ) ^ X 
PVQ =def VX : Prop.(P X ) {Q => X ) => X 
->P —ief P false 
3x : A.P(x) =def VX : Prop.(Vx : A.(P{x) X ) ) => X 
a =A b =def yPred : A -+ Prop.Pred(a) => Pred(b) 
Luo proved that ECC obeys the Church Rosser property, subject reduction and 
strong normalisation, and uses these to prove the consistency of the internal logic 
[Luo, 1994]. Computational equality and type checking are both decidable in ECC. 
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The unified theory of types (UTT) [Luo, 1994] is, essentially, ECC extended 
with inductive types. Goguen established, through the use of an operational se-
mantics, that UTT is strongly normalising [Goguen, 1994]. 
3,3 Theorem Proving and Lego 
The meta-theoretic properties for ECC and UTT described above mean that type 
checking is decidable. This means that an algorithm can be designed which given 
a judgement a:A, will check whether the object 'a' really is of type 'A ' . 
Since propositions are types (of their proofs) a proof checker can be written, 
which will take a proposition P, and an object p, and determine whether p is a proof 
of P. Lego [Pollack, 1989] [Luo and Pollack, 1992] is a proof assistant, using this 
idea, based on ECC and UTT. I t assists a user (by providing tactics) in building a 
proof of a proposition. 
Other theorem provers have also been developed based on the different type 
theories. Examples include NuPRL [Constable et a/., 1986], ALF [Augustsson et 
ai, 1990], Coq [Dowek, 1990]. A nice bonus for the method is that the term 
produced is independent of the program which produced i t . A user sceptical that 
the object jreally does prove a theoremJs free to build their own typexhecker (a 
relatively straightforward task) and to type check the object. 
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Example (P A Q) entails P 
Set the proposition up as a goal. The objective is to find an object of 
this type. 
Goal :UP,Q: Prop.(P A Q) -> P 
introduce arbitrary propositions A and B, Lego derives the new goal: 
A, B : Prop 
Goal : (A A B) -> A 
expand the definition of A based on the definitions given above: 
Goal : (IIC : Prop.(A -> B -> C) -+ C) -> A 
introduce a proof of the expanded term, Lego infers the new goal: 
H :(UC : Prop.(A -> B -> C) -> C) 
Goal : A 
Refine by H(A), i.e. use the object H(A) to infer the goal and make 
the new goal the antecedent: 
Goal . A ^ B ^ A 
introduce arbitrary objects a:A and b:B, Lego infers the new goal: 
a : A 
b:B 
Goal : A 
Refine by a, i.e. use the object a to infer the Goal. This completes the 
proof. Lego then works back through the steps and builds the proof 
object: 
XP, Q : Prop.XH : (P A Q).H(Xa : P.Xb : Q.a) 
3.4 Abstract Theories 
In doing proof development on a large scale it is useful i f a problem can be broken 
down, and attacked in a modular way. This is particularly so in computer science 
where the problem often involves reasoning about a class of data types, or code 
that gets re-used significantly. 
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With this in mind Luo developed the abstract theory mechanism for modular 
reasoning in UTT [Luo, 1994] [Luo, 1993]. 
The following notational convention shall be used for the rest of the thesis: 
T,[xi : Aux2 • A2,...,xn : An] 
will denote the sigma type: 
E z i : AiH,x2 : A 2 , . . . ,^4„ 
and iri wil l represent the obvious projection function that retrieves the i ' th entry 
of the (dependently typed) n-tuple. 
Def in i t i on 3.4.1 (Abs t rac t Theory) An abstract theory T, is a 4-tuple 
T = {Str[T],Ax[T],Thm[T],Prfs[T]) 
where 
® StrfT] contains the structure of T (usually a ~£ type). 
® AxfTj is a predicate over StrfT]. It defines some properties which T must 
obey. 
® ThmfTj is also a predicate over StrfT]. These are the theorems which are 
provable about T. 
© PrfsfTf is the abstract proof of the theorems of T. Its type is 
Vt: Str[T].Ax[T](t) Thm[T](t) 
For example, to define an abstract theory for semi-groups the structure type 
would contain entries for the carrier set and the operation: 
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Str{G] = S [X : Type, * : X -> X -» X] 
the axioms would be a predicate ensuring associativity, i.e. Vx, y, 2 : X.(x *(y* 
z)) = {{x *y)* z). This then provides an abstract framework for proving theorems 
about semi-groups. 
Moreover, i f a homomorphic mapping can be defined between two abstract 
theories then it is possible to inherit the theorems and proofs from one theory to 
another. 
For example, a theory for Groups could be defined following the same lines as 
the theory for semi-groups, only with an extra entry in the structure for the identity 
element, and an extra axiom corresponding to 'every element has an inverse'. There 
is an obvious (forgetful) homomorphic map between the abstract theories which 
allows proofs developed for semi-groups to be inherited by groups. 
A framework similar to this will be used to allow for a modular approach to 
reasoning about SemNet. Note that this framework explicitly uses both E types 
and impredicative Prop (through predicates) so that it could not be defined in 
either CC or Martin-Lof's type theory. 
3.5 Subtyping 
As discussed in the introduction type theory is more restrictive than set theory. 
This results in a more manageable language with useful features (such as decid-
ability of type checking). 
A consequence of the restrictions is that type theory has no obvious equivalent of 
the subset. This is serious for this work since the hierarchy is intuitively understood 
as a subset hierarchy. 
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The problem also has implications for the role of type theory as a tool for 
computer science, since a notion of subtype is extremely useful to model aspects 
such as re-use. Therefore there is a lot of research being done to establish coherent 
theories of subtyping that do not impinge on the 'useful properties' that type 
theories have [Jones, 1996]. 
This work will make use of subtyping based on coercive functions [Luo, 1996]. 
Here the basic subtyping relation is generalised from a basic set of coercions. To 
say A is a subtype of B: 
A r< B 
means that there is a (coercive) function K : A —> B and whenever an object 
a:A is used where an object of type B is expected then n(a) is used. Uniqueness of 
typing is lost, but it is replaced by a notion of all objects having a unique principal 
type, where the principal type loosely corresponds to the 'smallest' type. 
3.6 Constructive Type Theory for Natural lan-
guage 
As has already been outlined the main application of type theory has been for 
formal methods for software development and for formalisation of constructive 
mathematics. Indeed these applications have driven the design of the modern 
versions of the theories. 
An entirely separate application of type theory has been to use i t as a tool for 
studying natural language. Natural language is extremely complicated with many 
aspects. Cann [Cann, 1993] describes the task of formal semantics for natural 
language as 
"the study of meaning as expressed by the words, phrases and sentences 
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of Human languages. I t is, however, more usual within linguistics, to 
interpret the term more narrowly, as concerning, the study of those as-
pects of meaning encoded in linguistic expressions that are independent 
of their use on particular occasions by particular individuals within a 
particular speech community" 
Simple type theory (i.e. without dependent types) has long been a tool in this 
endeavour [Cann, 1993] [Dowty et a/., 1981]. Part of the reason for this is usage of 
functions and for quantification over types. 
Dependent types fo r quantif iers 
More recently Ranta [Ranta, 1994] has shown that aspects of Martin Lof's type 
theory are useful for categorising natural language. I t is argued that quantifiers for 
noun phrases are better captured through the dependent types: 
some 
an £ — types 
a certain 
every 
any > IT — types 
each 
Giving the following (loose) interpretations: 
a man owns a donkey as T,x : man.Sy : donkey.owns(x,y) 
every man owns a donkey as Hx : man.,£y : donkey.owns(x,y) 
The £ type is also used to build up complex noun phrases. For example, 
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old man as Ex : man.old x 
man that owns a donkey as Sx : man.Hy : donkey.owns(x, y) 
In this way, such noun phrases can be treated directly as constituents (rather 
than being dissolved as an antecedent in predicate calculus) of sentences. For 
example, "every old man walks" can be interpreted as 
Hz : (Ex : man.old x)walks nl z 
rather than as Va; : man.old x walks x. 
£ types model progression 
A main argument for using the dependent types is that they can model progression 
of a text or discourse. For example, to capture the conjunction and implication 
involved in: 
"a man walks and he whistles" 
" i f a man walks he whistles" 
The initial statement, in both cases, "a man walks" is interpreted as: 
TiX : man.walks x 
interpreting conjunction as a S — type and implication as a I I — type (rather 
than as A and =>) means that the interpretations of the second statement, "he 
whistles" can model the progression of the statements by extracting the relevant 
parts of the initial statement (as occurs in natural language). 
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Hz : (Ex : man.walks x).whistles TTI Z 
Hz : (T,x : man.walks x).whistles 7rl Z 
Similarly the 'donkey sentence' can be interpreted as: 
Hz : (T,x : man.Ey : donkey.owns(x,y)).beats(irl z,nl (ir2 z)) (3.1) 
This aspect of dependent types is used in this work to model how SemNet builds 
and re-uses concepts, see sections 7.2 and 7.5. 
Contexts and possible wor ld semantics 
Ranta also considers modelling statements of belief. Essentially each agent is as-
signed a context consisting of judgements they have made. The contexts then act 
like possible worlds [Meyer and der Hoek, 1995], except that since the context can 
be progressive, later beliefs can depend on earlier ones. What the agent believes 
are all the judgements that are provable in this context. 
This is of course extremely relevant to this work. In particular SemNet has con-
structs for representing the above features of language and so i t will be interesting 
to see if the constructive aspects of UTT are useful for capturing these constructs. 
3.7 Motivations for using U T T 
In summary there seem to be many good reasons for attempting to formalise Sem-
Net using UTT and Lego. These are summarised as follows: 
o The intuitive meaning of SemNet nodes is defined by their properties, rather 
than their extension. I t seems that type theory with intensionally defined 
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functions may provide a better tool for a better interpretation of nodes than 
sets. 
© Event nodes in SemNet correspond to statements. This causes difficulties in 
set theory, as statements cannot naturally be interpreted as sets. However in 
type theory propositions are first class objects (i.e. types) and so events can 
be interpreted as objects of type Prop. 
e The work of Ranta has shown that constructive type theory has features 
that describe complex aspects of natural language. Since SemNet claims 
to represent various complex aspects of natural language, constructive type 
theory seems an ideal tool for testing this out. 
• UTT is a well established mathematical theory with many useful properties, 
including an internal logic which is consistent. As well as this research devel-
oped for applications to computer science have left behind a useful legacy of 
tools and techniques including: 
— Abstract reasoning mechanism for modular approach to problem solving. 
— The proof assistant, Lego, which helps in the development of proofs and 
provides machine based proof (type) checking. 
_— SemNet has been written_in Haskell [Hudak et al., 1992] , a-strongly 
typed functional programming language [Bird and Wadler, 1988], [Holyer, 
1991]. Therefore it may be straightforward to convert this code into Lego 
code, and so apply techniques from formal methods. 
Chapter 4 
SemNet 
The role of this chapter is to informally introduce SemNet and its associated rea-
soning mechanisms. Unless stated the current implementation will be described. 
Some representation issues are under current development and are described since 
it is felt that the work of this thesis contributes to the discussion. 
As discussed in chapter 1, a KR for NLE must be expressive, natural, readable, 
efficient, robust, and flexible. In this chapter the aim will be to convince the 
reader, intuitively, that SemNet meets these aims. A metric distributedness 
which is directly related to these attributes is described. To show the relevance of 
this metric a short analysis of its application to SemNeTand other representations 
is described. 
No formal attempt at interpretation is made in this chapter, however, in some 
cases where ambiguity could arise, classical set theory is used to express informal 
meanings. 
4.1 SemNet basics 
In common with semantic networks SemNet is a graph based representation, where 
concepts and relationships are represented by nodes and arcs. "Knowledge" is 
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elicited by graph traversal. SemNet has been designed specifically for NLE [Shiu 
et al., 1996], in particular i t needs to be expressive, efficient, robust, flexible and 
easily integratable with other modules. SemNet supports many forms of reasoning 
as well as fully exploiting inheritance. There are, for example, models of epis-
temic reasoning, time and location [Short, 1996], reasoning by analogy [Long and 
Garigliano, 1994] and standard logical connective reasoning. 
4.1.1 Nodes and Arcs 
There are 3 types of nodes: entities, events (assertions) and actions. There are 
3 types of directed arcs: subject, object and action which can be read/traversed 
in either direction. Only event nodes can have a subject, object or action arc 
attached. Only action nodes can be an action for an event node. 
Figure 4.1 shows a section of SemNet graph. Event nodes correspond to state-
ments. The event node E l states that "Every FARMER1 OWNS a D 0 N K E Y 1 " . 
The two 'spec' links are a shorthand for events with 'specialisation' as action. From 
now on such 'hierarchy' events wil l regularly be considered and drawn as links, and 
will be termed 'event links' or 'hierarchy events'. The subject/object arcs deter-
mine the direction of the statement. Intuitively events state that the referenced 
-concepts are involved in-a relation (labelled by the action). On each node there is-








Figure 4.1: Basic SemNet graph 
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The meaning of the tags are as follows: 
• Universal [U] refers to "instances" of the concept and says that all the 
"instances" of the concept are involved in relationship specified by the event. 
• Exis tent ia l [E] refers to the "instances" of the concept, but the "instance" 
involved depends on the particular "instance" of some other universally quan-
tified concept involved in the event. 
• Framed Universal [FU] (not used in the diagram) is used when a depen-
dency works in both directions, i.e. as a shorthand for having two Universal-
Existential events. For example, i f FARMER! and D0NKEY1 were both 
tagged with FU quantifications, then the event would state that: 
"Every FARMER1 OWNS a D 0 N K E Y 1 ' and 'every D0NKEY1 is 
owned by a FARMER1" 
• I nd iv idua l [I] (not used in the diagram) refers to the concept as a "whole" 
and says that it is involved in the relationship specified by the event. 
• Named Ind iv idua l [NI ] (not used in the diagram) is the same as the indi-
vidual tag except that the concept has a fixed name. 
As well as making assertions, events define the concepts which they reference. 
For example, FARMER1 is defined as the concept "farmers that own donkeys" and 
D0NKEY1 as "donkeys owned by a farmer". 
4.1.2 Negation of events 
An action can be negated, so that an event states that the referenced concepts are 
explicitly not in the labelled relationship. 
For example, E l in figure 4.2 asserts that "Every FARMER2 does not own one 
of the D0NKEY2's", thus defining FARMER2 as the "farmers that do not own all 
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F A R M E R [ U ] D O N K E Y [ U ] 
spec spec 







Figure 4.2: Negated Event 
donkeys" and DONKEY2 as the "donkeys that are not owned by some farmer". 
In first order logic: 
This is equivalent to insisting that negations can only be applied to 'atomic' 1 
propositions in J-OVC. Therefore to negate an event, as well as negating the action 
the quantification tags also need to be changed2. For example, the negation of E\ 
in figure 4.1 is E3 in figure 4.3. The 'inst' link is a shorthand for an event with 
'instance' as action. 
xThat is, an un-quantified proposition without any logical connectives. 
2Except when the referred concept acts as a constant, e.g. if it is a Named Individual. 
Vx3yFARMER2(x) (DONKEY2(y) A ^OWNS{x,y)) 
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F A R M E R f U ] D O N K E Y f U 
spec spec 
F A R M E R 1 U D O N K E Y ! [El 
obj 







Figure 4.3: Logical Negation of an Event 
In first order logic: 
3x.Vy(FARMERl(x) A DONKEY{y) A ->OWNS{x,y)) 
There is a negation function not : Event —» Event which implements this. 
4.2 K R and the world 
The information which is recorded within SemNet is intended to reflect the world 
as it is understood by the agent that uses the network (LOLITA). No claim is made 
that the representation reflects the world as it really is (if there is such a thing), 
nor even that the representation reflects some consensus view of the way the world 
is. 
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4.2.1 SemNet and Language 
I t should be stressed that SemNet is intended to represent knowledge declaratively 
and independently of natural language. As discussed in chapter 1, many of the 
surface linguistic features of an utterance have been removed. For example, active 
and passive versions of statements are normalised out during analysis and replaced 
(according to requirements) during generation [Smith, 1995]. 
The concepts are finer grained than words, however, with the principle that 
words only occur in a language when they correspond with a useful concept, many 
of the nodes of SemNet correspond directly with words. WordNet [Miller, 1990] 
has been used to help in building these concepts into SemNet. 
4.2.2 Meaning as Location 
No concepts have a pre-defined meaning in SemNet. The meaning of a node/concept 
is defined by its location in the network3. For example, from figure 4.1: 
FARMER! is the concept of 'FARMER'S that own a DONKEY' 
but of course, FARMER and DONKEY have no pre-defined meaning, their 
meaning is established by reading their local connections. Doing this defines 
FARMER1 further, i.e. 
FARMER1 is the concept of "HUMANs that own and cultivate a FARM' 
that own a DONKEY" 
and FARMER1 is only defined when FARMER and DONKEY are fully defined, 
i.e. when the whole network has been read. 
3This is an informal notion that will be investigated further in the later chapters. 
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4o3 Control Variables 
Each node has an associated set of controls. Controls contain standard information 
shared by a large number of nodes. For example, the type of a node (i.e. event, 
action or entity), and the quantification tags of the entity nodes are stored as 
controls. 
In theory the information stored as controls could be expressed as part of 
the graph. However, in each design decision based on the fact that this 
information is looked up regularly, has been made to store the information lo-
cally/internally. 








B E L I E V E S 
ROBERTO[Nl] 
Figure 4.4: Epistemic Event 
It is possible for LOLITA to believe that another agent believes some event to 
hold. For example, LOLITA may believe that "Roberto believes that every farmer 
owns a donkey.", see figure 4.4. This syntax is similar to the 'proposition' nodes of 
SNePS (see section 2.4!) and allows recursive nesting of beliefs. 
According to the description given so far, there is no difference between the 
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way E i is represented when LOLITA believes it, and when it is there merely as a 
part of some other event which LOLITA believes (of course it could be both). A 
'status control' makes this distinction, status 'real' means that the event is part of 
LOLITA's belief set (i.e. she believes it) and status 'hypothetical' means the event 
is there merely as a substructure to some other 'real' event. 
The above description is how SemNet is implemented currently. Some design issues 
can already be discussed. 
4=5.1 Observed Events 
It is often useful to refer to complex concepts without affecting their meaning. For 
example to represent the well known donkey sentence, 
"Every farmer that owns a donkey beats it" 
requires the concept of "farmers that own donkeys" as the subject for the beating 
event, but_wjth the current structure, if a beating ev_ent is added, then the concept 
is changed to "farmers that own and beat a donkey". The proposed solution is to 
have a different event type, which makes assertions but does not define its reference 
concepts, as in E2 in figure 4.5. This mimics the progression that occurs so often 
in natural languages as discussed in section 3.6. By re-referring to the same node, 
unique concepts for unique nodes is preserved, see section 2.3.3. 
A further rule required here is that when a node is re-visited, then the reference 
is to the same instance previously scoped. In this example this means that if E i 
has been 'traversed' then a 'donkey owning farmer' and 'the donkey he owns' will 
have been specified, after this if E 2 is 'traversed' the interpretation is that it is this 
same 'donkey owning farmer' that 'beats' the same 'donkey'. Without this rule, E 2 
4,5 Representation Issues 
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F A R M E R [ U ] D O N K E Y [U] 
spec spec 
V 
F A R M E R 1 [ U ] 
V 








B E A T S 
Figure 4.5: Proposed SemNet graph for the 'donkey sentence' 
would simply say that every 'donkey owning farmer ' beats some 'donkey owned 
by a farmer'. 
Connections wi th known networks 
The separation of defining and observing events is the same distinction made be-
tween T-box statements and A-box statements in KL-ONE (see section 2.2). How-
ever in SemNet both event types are subject to the same semantic analysis and 
inference engine modules so that there is a very close coupling between the two 
sorts of information, as demanded by [Beierle et a/., 1992]. 
Defined Events and Necessity 
Observed events have a different effect on the meaning of a concept. In figure 4.6 
node X can be interpreted as: "Computer Science staff that play football", and it 
is an observed fact that "all X's study A I " . It is reasonable to state that: 
"all X's necessarily play football" 









Figure 4.6: SemNet graph, showing necessity 
but it is not reasonable to state that: 
"all X's necessarily study AI" 
Algorithms which need this distinction (e.g. causality [Poria and Garigliano, 
1996] and generation) should use the observed event accordingly. 
4.5.2 Quantification on the arcs 
A concept can be referred to by many events. It is possible that a node be referenced 
with different quantifications. For example to represent the sentence: 
"Every mother has a brother each of whom owns a parrot." 
The concept for brother is used twice, once as an existential concept and once 
as a universal. Since quantification is tied to the concept the only way this can be 
done at the moment is to make two copies of the concept see figure 4.7. Clearly 
this is not efficient in terms of net size. Alternative solutions are to move the 
quantification tags on to the arcs, see figure 4.8, or to have them as controls on the 
event. 
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MOTHER[U] BROTHER[E] 






Figure 4.7: Current quantification scheme, example problem. 
The hierarchy events actually treat 'Universal' concepts as 'Individual' since 
they refer to the 'set' as a whole. Changing the scheme will allow a more general 
approach to concept referencing. 
From now on it is assumed that quantification is attached to the event node. 
4.5.3 Named Individuals and constants 
An initial, intuitive interpretation for concepts might be to treat individuals as 
variables and named individuals as constants. 
For example, interpretations for E i and E 2 in figure 4.9 could be: 












\ obj OWNS 
E 
PARROT 
Figure 4.8: New quantification scheme, solution. 
Ei = Vx.x € dogs Likes(Sanjay,x) 
E2 = By.Vx.x G dogs —> Likes(y,x) 
Further analysis shows the situation to be more complex. If an individual is 
referred to by an observed event, then it too behaves like a constant, e.g. E3 refers 
to the constant 'man that likes all dogs' (i.e. MAN1) and states that he 'hates all 
cats'. Also the concept 'Sanjay' is not defined at all by event Ei, it is denned as 
the concept with name 'Sanjay'. Therefore, quantification and 'naming' of concepts 
are separate. For the remainder of this thesis it will be assumed that if a concept 
is named, this will be stored as a control on the node (effectively a shorthand to 
say this concept is defined as the concept with this name). The 'named individual' 
quantification will not be used. 
Chapter 4: SemNet 59 













E l defining 
E2 defining 
E3 observing 
Figure 4.9: Example showing names as properties 
4.6 Reasoning Mechanisms on SeniNet 
As stated there are many inference algorithms that have been designed and im-
plemented for SemNet. All reasoning proceeds by passing an event (intuitively a 
proposition) to SemNet and an algorithm determines whether the event (proposi-
tion) or its negation is entailed (validly or plausibly) by SemNet. Before allowing 
an event to be added to SemNet the reasoning mechanisms first check that neither 
it or its negation can be inferred^ _ _ — 
4.6.1 SemNet linear Notation 
To list the inference rules, the following notation will be used: 
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R2, R3, ••• will represent arbitrary actions 
A, B, C, D (occasionally indexed) will represent arbitrary entities 
a, b, c will represent individual nodes 
(when it is clear that a node is an individual) 
Ei, E2, E3,... will represent arbitrary events 
bb will represent arbitrary boolean values 
Qit Q2, Q31 • •• will represent arbitrary quantification tags 
The structure of events will be written as: 
{Ri,bb,A,QhB,Qk) 
For example, (OWNS,true,FARMERl,U,DONKEYl,E), represents Ex in fig-
ure 4.1. Occasionally, when no confusion can arise the boolean and quantification 
values will be omitted. For example, (BELIEVES,ROBERTO, El) represents E 2 
in figure 4.4. Hierarchy events will be written as: 
4.6.2 The Entity Hierarchy 
All the entity concepts lie in a hierarchy. There is a top concept (called "Entity") 
and all the other entities are either specialisations or instances of "Entity", see 
figure 4.10. Specialisation and instances may usefully be interpreted as the subset 
and membership relations of set theory, however, since entities will be formally 
interpreted as types, this will not be strictly correct. Again the specialisation 
and instance events have been drawn as links. Negated occurences here actually 
a £ A 
A ^ B 
a e A 
- (A hs B) 
informally, B is a specialisation of A 
informally B is not a specialisation of A 
informally, a is an instance of A 
informally, a is not an instance of A 
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correspond to the logical negation, as the entities are referred to as constants. 
E N T I T Y 
spei 
THING 
THING 1 ANIMAL 
spec 
M A M M A L 
\spec 
HUMAN 
insl / \ spa 
notspa 
FIDO HUMAN 1 ... FARMER 
Figure 4.10: Section of the Entity hierarchy of SemNet 
Each event which is explicitly present in the network is treated as an axiom, 
and so can immediately be inferred. There are two rules for deriving spec events: 
4.1 
A ys B, B >zs C 
AhsC 
4.2 
Ahs B,^{A hs C) 
hs C) 
At this stage there is no closed world assumption, so that the second rule is the 
only way in which a nonspec relation can be inferred. Inheritance rules for the 
basic events are: 
4.3 
fc€ B,A hs B 
be A 4.4 
a £ A, A ys B 
a <fc B 
4.5 
A hs B,(R,bb,A,U,C,Q) 
(R,bb,B,U,C,Q) 
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a e A,(R,bb,A,U,C,Q) 
4.6 
(R,bb,a,I,C,Q) 
D C,(R,bb,C,E,A,U) 4.7 
(72, bb,D,E,A, U) 
a e A, (R, bb, A,U,B, E) 
4.8 j(a) new 
f ( a ) € B , ( R , b b , a , I J { a ) , I ) 
These rules allow for very efficient inference by searching up and down the 
hierarchy. The above operate only on the subject of each event and there are an 
equivalent set of rules for the objects. 
The intuition behind these rules is as follows: 
4.5 captures the inheritance involved in inferring that 
"all HUMANs eat food" implies "all FARMER'S eat food". 
4.6 captures the inheritance involved in inferring that 
"all DOG's like food" implies "Fido likes food". 
4.7 captures the inheritance involved in inferring that 
"There is a DOG that likes all HUMANs" implies "There is an 
ANIMAL that likes all HUMANs". 
4.8 captures the inheritance involved in inferring that 
"All DOGS like a HUMAN" implies "There is a HUMAN that FIDO likes" 
4.6.3 The action hierarchy 
As well as the entity hierarchy there is an action hierarchy. 
Writing an action spec event as 
Ri ^ SQ Rj 
The associated inference rules are: 




FRY B A K E 
Figure 4.11: A section of the Action Hierarchy 
# 2 hsa Ri,{Ri,true,A,Qi,B,Q2) 
4.9 
(R2,true, A,Q1,B,Q2) 
R2 hsa Ru (R2, false, A, Q u B, Q2) 
4.10 
(Ri, false, A,QUB,Q2) 
4.9 captures the intuition behind inferring 
"Simon fries an egg" implies "Simon cooks an egg" 
4.10 captures the intuition behind inferring 
"Simon did not cook an egg" implies "Simon did not fry an egg" 
4.6.4 Connective Reasoning 
A further type of events are the logical connective events. £ 3 in figure 4.12 is a 
logical connective event with action 'Implies'. 
The logic actions are: Implies, Or, and And. Their intended meanings are the 
standard logical connectives of relevant propositional logic [Anderson and Belnap, 
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R O B E R T O [ N I ] D O N K E Y l [ I ] 
OWNS 
I M P L I E S 
Figure 4.12: An example logical event 
1975]. The associated inference rules ('not' is the negation function discussed in 
section 4.1.2) are: 
ModusPonens 
(implies, E±, E2), E\ 
E2 
ModusTolens 








There is a 'Cause' action which behaves similarly to 'Implies' except that it is 
intended to capture the situation where there is a temporal dependency between 
the referenced events, [Short, 1996]. 
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Since 'Implies' is used relevantly, rules such as: 
E2 
[implies, Ei, E2) 
are not valid. Capturing the meaning of relevant implication formally is difficult 
since its derivation is not truth functional. 
Many of the other representations which could be used in inference, such as: 
(and, Ei,E2) 
are not listed as they are normalised out during the analysis phase. 
4.6.5 Epistemic reasoning 
Epistemic events have an agent as subject, an event as object and an epistemic 
relation (for example, know, believe or think) as action, see figure 4.4. Currently 
all epistemic relations (i.e. know, believe and think are treated in the same way). 
It plausibly follows that a man that believes that "all farmers own a donkey" 
also believes that "all small farmers own a donkey". The intuition behind the 
epistemic rules are that LOLITA assumes that all agents are capable of making 
the same inferences as she can. Therefore there is an epistemic rule for each of the 
rules previously described, essentially allowing LOLITA to assume that the agent 
can apply that rule. For example, the epistemic version for rule 4.1 (transitivity of 
spec relations) is: 
{ R e p i , Agent, (A hs B)), ( R e p i , Agent, (B y s C)) 
4.11 
(Repi, Agent, (A >zs C)) 
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which captures the intuition in the above inference. 
As well as these there are also rules which assume that if 'an agent believes 
something' then 'the agent believes that they believe that something', i.e. 
(Repi, Agent, E) 
4.12 
(Repi, Agent, ( R e p i , Agent, E)) 
and that ' if an agent believes 'E is not the case" then 'the agent does not believe 
that 'E is the case", i.e. 
(Repi, true, Agent, not(E)) 
(Repi> false, Agent, E) 
4.7 NLE principles 
Chapter 1 outlined the aim of adding formality to the intuitive good points of 
SemNet. These were based around the NLE principles. Having described SemNet 
in more detail, we are now in a position to describe (although still informally) how 
it meets some of these principles. These will motivate the areas which this project 
will attempt to formalise. 
4.7.1 'Correctness' of Reasoning 
In order to be more formal, a mapping to a formal language needs to be given. The 
rules should then be shown to be sound with respect to this formal interpretation. 
If the rules are not sound then it might be expected that the rules correspond to 
some intuitively plausible sequence/operation in the semantics. 
The other aspect of correctness that could be looked at is how well the imple-
mentation corresponds to the definitions given. Ideally there would be a translation 
to some programming language structures and a proof that the code implements 
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the declarative rules. 
4,7.2 Expressiveness for NLE 
This chapter has shown that SemNet can represent basic relationships, and state-
ments with anaphora and complex dependent quantifications (including the well 
known problematic 'donkey sentence' structure). 
Mechanisms are provided to represent and reason about epistemic statements 
and the standard logical connectives. 
SemNet defines concepts in terms of their properties (which result from their 
location in the network). Some properties are necessary facts and some are not. 
To show this more formally a semantic model is required. To analyse the above 
aspects the semantic language must be capable of 'expressing' each of them. Anal-
ysis, apart from establishing that the different structures have a clear and distin-
guished interpretation, will involve giving semantic counterparts to any algorithms 
which operate on these structures. 
It would be useful if the manner in which these aspects are built is similar in 
both SemNet and its semantic counterpart. To give a straightforward example, if 
the semantic language were TOVC the logical action 'AND' will clearly map to 
the logical connective 'A'. This correspondence means that syntactic operations 
involving this 'action' are easily understood in terms of the formal semantics. 
As discussed in chapter 2, there has been much research investigating the idea 
that semantic networks give up expressiveness in order to gain tractable sound 
and complete reasoning (something not possible for full TOVC). Instead various 
heuristics are used for various efficiency reasons and no claim is made for complete-
ness. With this in mind it is still interesting to attempt some form of metric for how 
expressive SemNet is. The formal model will consist of a mapping of all SemNet 
structures into a language. This will serve as a starting point for considering an 
inverse mapping from the semantic language into SemNet structures. This in turn 
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will be a starting point for measuring the expressiveness of SemNet. 
4.7.3 Developer cQHiprehend=ability 
Subjectively, SemNet is readable and easily comprehendible. It is important from 
a team development (and hence engineering/pragmatic) viewpoint that this is so. 
However, again, as the scale and complexity increases there is a danger that differ-
ent developers have different interpretations which could lead to incorrect assump-
tions and code. 
A formal semantic model will address this problem as it provides an unambigu-
ous reference point for the meaning of constructs. 
4.7.4 Flexibility and Robustness 
Information is retrieved and inferred from SemNet by graph traversal. Intuitively 
there is a lot of flexibility in the structure. It seems that any node can be picked and 
from there any arc can be traversed (in any direction) and 'reasonable' information 
can be 'read'. 
Such flexibility is extremely useful since it allows the inference engine designer 
the freedom to choose the most appropriate path for any inference algorithm with-
out worrying about the interpretation. Similarly the generator can take any amount 
of the net and 'say' it, and rely on it being a reasonable part of the belief set of 
LOLITA. 
This flexibility is useful from a robustness point of view as if it is necessary to 
stop traversing a graph (for whatever reason) the information gained is still reliable. 
The next section elaborates on these informal notions, starting to build a proper 
theory for it. 
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4»8 Distributedness 
This section is a cut down description of the work described in [Short et ai, 1996]. 
A network is said to be distributed if any section of network gives meaningful 
information which is sound with respect to the full reading of the network. 
If a formal semantic model were in place, 'full reading' could be defined as the 
full model of the network, and the interpretation of any section should be entailed 
by the full model. 
Distributedness is related to compositionality, which demands that the full 
meaning of the network should be a function of the meaning of its syntactic sections. 
Distributedness adds the requirement that not only must they be an argument of 
the function, but must also be sound with respect to the result of the function. 
4.8.1 Distributedness of SemNet 
In SemNet a single node (say El in figure 4.1) tells us nothing, except that some 
concept exists. Its controls will specify its type (event, real in this case). Every 
arc attached to the node specifies Ei further: the action arc specifies the relation, 
the subject arc specifies that it is all the instances of FARMERi that participate 
in the owning relation in the subject role, and the object arc specifies that there is 
a (scoped) instance of DONKEYi which participates in the relation in the object 
role. This information is a sound sub-part of the interpretation that all instances 
of FARMERx own a (scoped) instance of DONKEYi Thus each arc conveys an 
independent and sound piece of information about the node. As a further exam-
ple, the spec link tells us that FARMERi is a 'subset'4 of FARMER which only 
adds to the interpretation. Ei is still not entirely defined: each node is only fully 
defined by the whole semantic network. Information which must be picked up to 
preserve soundness of interpretation is the control determining whether an event is 
4 The terms subset and superset are used loosely here; formal interpretations are considered in 
chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
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hypothetical or real, as i t can be discarded i f i t is hypothetical. 
This aspect is exploited by the inheritance algorithm. Although the rules are 
listed i n terms of fu l l y defined events, the implementation (of say rule 4.1) relies on 
the 'subject' of an event being read independently f r o m the rest of i t . For example, 
i f the subject is 'universal' then the inheritance algori thm w i l l search 'up ' the enti ty 
hierarchy, whatever the object and actions are. 
4.8.2 Distributedness of other Semantic Networks 
The remainder of this section describes some in i t ia l investigations into the dis-
tributedness of other representations. This is done not as a cri t icism of other 
networks, but to test out the relevance of these new properties and also to t r y and 
show where SemNet differs f r o m other well known networks. 
I t is perhaps easiest to consider TOVC. A knowledge base of TOVC would be 
a list of statements. 
\/xVy(Farmer(x) A Donkey(y) A Owns(x, y)) —> Beats(x,y) 
Distributedness is the extent to which subsections of this can be taken and inter-
preted. Each individual statement can be taken and used independently. However, 
in most cases, i t w i l l not be possible to take a subsection of a TOVC statement 
and consider i t as a sound part of the knowledge base. For example, i f the in i t i a l 
segment of the above statement is taken, i.e. 
^x\/y{Farmer{x) A Donkey(y) A Owns(x,y)) 
this is clearly not something that follows f r o m the f u l l knowledge base. 
The T-Box of K L - O N E based systems [Woods and Schmolze, 1992], [Beierle et 
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al., 1992] is Semantic Net based, the A-Box usually consisting of F O L statements. 
Thus the A-Box suffers f r o m the same problems as above. However the T-Box 
which defines concepts can be traversed, seemingly in an unrestricted way. This 
shows that this aspect of K L - O N E could be distributed, although to show this 
formal ly the semantic model described in section 2.2 would need to be used. 
DONKEY FARMER STAT OWN PTNT 
^STAT^ *- ^ P T N ^ » TNT  B E A T 
Figure 4.13: CGT graph for the donkey sentence 
C G T [Sowa, 1984] builds complex logical assertions using contexts. Figure 4.13 
shows how the donkey sentence is represented by C G T . This use of contexts requires 
the whole context to be read/traversed for any sense to be made. For example, the 
innermost sub-context is interpreted as "Farmers do not beat Donkeys". I f this 
is read independently f r o m the rest, the interpretation derived is not sound w i t h 
respect to that provided by the f u l l context. For C G T the independent pieces of 
network must be at the level of a context rather than its components. This is less 
distributed than SemNet, where arcs f o r m the smallest independent pieces of the 
network. 
o 0 action acl Ml BEAT 
agent object 
0 O o o some f±U3 class V2 V I member member 
agenl object al 
o o action OWN act 
Figure 4.14: ANALOG/SNePS graph for the donkey sentence 
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Figure 4.14 shows how A N A L O G represents the donkey sentence. This rep-
resentation is similar to SemNet. The structured variable nodes V I and V2 are 
defined by their outgoing arcs. These defined V I as: "the intersection of all fa rm-
ers and all things that own a donkey" and V2 as "some donkeys, scoped by the 
variable V I " . These variables are re-used by M l which states the beating event. 
As in SemNet, a rule is needed to state that the beaten donkey is the same donkey 
that is owned by the farmer. 
In tui t ively each arc can be read independently and soundly. However i t is 
not clear how negative statements are made in A N A L O G . I n SemNet, negation is 
always attached to the action (i.e. the relation), so that other information can be 
read independently. SNePs would also have to mimic this to be distributed. 
4.9 Review 
This chapter has given a description of the structure of SemNet. In particular 
more detail has been added to the proposition as types and meaning as location 
principles. A n explanation of the hierarchy, the inference engine and some of the 
current research issues of SemNet have been described. I t should be stressed again 
that performing the semantic analysis has changed the authors view of i t leading 
to better understanding, hopefully more abstract and hopefully a better exposition 
of i t . 
For the rest of this thesis, this aspect of the contribution w i l l not be fur ther 
expanded. Instead, two models w i l l be bu i l t , one set theoretic and one type the-




The role of this chapter is to highlight some of the problems involved in formalising 
SemNet. A set theoretic semantic model of SemNet is developed. This is then used 
to analyse some of the properties of SemNet, including distributedness. 
5.1 Set Theoretic Semantics 
I n chapter 4 the pr imi t ive syntactic objects of SemNet were the three node types 
(entity, event and action) and the three arc types (subject, object and action). The 
inference rules were each given in terms of f u l l y defined events. Their substructures 
(defined by the arcs) were not used. Since the first objective of the formalisation 
is to understand the inference engine, arcs w i l l not be interpreted. 
I t turns out that concepts which are quantified w i t h 'Universal ' and 'Existential ' 
tags behave differently f r o m those w i t h ' Indiv idual ' tags. These are split into two 
fur ther primitives universals and individual concepts (nodes). 
SemNet is re-defined as: 
• a set of universal concepts, CU 
• a set of individual concepts, C I 
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© a set of action concepts, CA 
o a set of event concepts, CE (defined in terms of the other concepts) 
As indicated in 4.4.1 the natural starting point is to interpret universal concepts 
as sets, and the enti ty hierarchy as subset and membership statements. 
More formally, postulate a set of objects, V which fo rm the domain of discourse. 
A model of SemNet is formed by a set of mapping functions AA.Sindex which map 
the concepts into the following types 1 : 
MSU : CU -+ P(V) 
MSi :CI->V 
MSa : CA P(V x V) 
MSe : CE —> {true, false} 
The hierarchy events map to subset and membership statements: 
MSe{AhsB) i—>• (MSU(A) D MSU(B)) 
MSe(a(EA) ^ {MSi{a) e MSU(A)) 
Basic events take the dual role of making assertions and defining concepts. For 
example, the nodes in figure 4 .1: F, F i , D , and D i (for F A R M E R , F A R M E R 1 , 
D O N K E Y , and D 0 N K E Y 1 ) map to subsets of D , and 0 (for OWNS) into D x D . 
E i defines D i as: 
MSU{DX) = {x | x € D A 3y(y G F A 0(y, x))} 
and makes the statement: 
Where V returns the power set (i.e. set of subsets) of a set. 
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Ex = Vx3y{x e F ^ i y e D A 0{x, y))) 
I n general the assertions and definitions made by an event w i l l depend on the 
quantifications involved, see figure 5.1. 










Figure 5.1: General Event Structure. 
E v e n t s w i th a bounded existential 
I f q l is universal and q2 is existential, then E is interpreted as: 
(\/x3y(x G A-t (y € B 
AR(x,y)))) 
{x | x e A' A 3y(y e B' 
AR(x,y))} 
{x | x 6 B' A 3y(y e A 
AR{y,x))} 
Notice that A is defined in terms of A', B' and R, whereas the definit ion of 
(R,true,A,U,B,E) h-> « 
The statement: 
defining A as 
defining B as: 
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B uses A. Essentially, A must be bui l t and defined before i t can be validly used 
to bui ld and define B . Wi thou t this distinction their definitions would depend, 
recursively on each other. The event would also be symmetrical. 
E v e n t s w i th an indiv idual 
I f q l is universal and q2 is individual , then E is defined as 
(R,true, A, U, B,I)t-^ < 
The statement: 3yVx(x G A) ->• (y G B' A R(x, y)) 
defining B as: Be B' 
defining A as: {a; | x G A' A R(x, B)} 
Individuals are interpreted as arbitrary, but specified, members of the set meet-
ing the definition provided by the defining event. Named individual concepts map 
to constants, as they are already defined as being the concept w i t h the specified 
name. 
U n i v e r s a l - U n i v e r s a l E v e n t s 
Intui t ively events w i t h just universals would map as: 
(R,true,A,U,B,U) •-»• < 
The statement: Vx\/y((x G A) A (y 6 B)) 
-> Act(x, y) 
defining A as: {a; | x G X A Vy € B 
(Act(x,y))} 
and B as: {x \ x G X A Vy G A 
{Act(y,x))} 
except that the definitions of A and B depend recursively on each other. This is 
exactly the problem mentioned in section 2.2 and discussed in [Nebel, 1991]. The 
problem is best highlighted by an example. Consider the graph in figure 5.2. 
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C H I L D R E N 
spec 




L I K E S 
Figure 5.2: Example of i l l defined concepts 
I f the concepts are interpreted as: 
Children = {Simon, Daniel, Amanda} 
Toys = {Car, Soldier, Doll} 
and suppose that: 
Simon likes the car and the soldier 
Daniel likes the soldier and the doll 
Amanda likes the car and the doll 
In this case the concepts C and T ' are undefined, and there is no way of inferring 
whether or not Simon is in C . Therefore an event should never define two universal 
nodes. 
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Events w i th non-actions map to equivalent formulas, except that the 2-place 
relation is negated. For example, E l in figure 4.2 is mapped to: 
V.-r3y(x e F2 -> (y G D2 A -i0(a:,y))) 
Act ion spec events map to the subset relation between 2-place relations over V. 
The logical actions OR and A N D map to the usual logical connectives: 
MSe{Rx hs* R2) ^ MSa(Ri) 2 MSa(R2) 
MSe(OR,EuE2) ^ ^ v ^ ) 
Me(AND,ElyE2) ^ MeiE^ A Me(E2) 
As mentioned in chapter 4, the implicat ion action of SemNet is intended to 
reflect 'relevant' implicat ion. Relevant implicat ion is not t r u t h theoretic and so 
cannot be captured by classical logic. There is a wide community of researchers 
working on how the meaning of relevant impl icat ion can be captured [Anderson 
and Belnap, 1975], [Dunn, 1986]. For this project i t is observed that the oper-
ations performed by SemNet should certainly be sound w i t h respect to material 
implicat ion. Further analysis w i l l not be considered. 
Hypothetical events are mapped as above except that they are not necessarily 
' true' in the set theoretic model. 
5.1.1 Soundness of the Inference Rules 
Given this interpretation i t is straightforward to show the soundness of the inheri-
tance rules. Each rule has to be ' t rue ' for each event type. For example, the (set 
theoretic) semantic counterpart rule 4.5 applied to the bounded existential case is: 
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B C A , (Vx3y( .T e A ->• (y € C A i2(ar, y ) ) ) ) 
Va:3y(a: G B -> (1/ G C A R(x,y))) 
We prove this as follows: 
T h e o r e m 5.1.1 (Soundness of R u l e 4.5) Given any sets A, B and C, if B C 
A and Va;3y(x £ i ( j / G C A i2(s, y))) then 
Wx3y(x G f l - ^ ( t / G C A R(x,y))) 
P r o o f 
For any x: 
x € B x e A since B C A 
=>• 3y(y € C A R(x,y)) f r o m 2nd assumption 
and so 
Vx3y(:r 6 5 -> (y G C A R{x,y))) 
a 
5.2 Defined and Observed Events 
I t seems straightforward to extend these semantics to cover defined and observed 
events. The only difference is to ensure that 'observing' events do not 'define' the 
nodes they are connected to. I n this sense observed events do not contribute to 
the meaning of nodes, which seems converse to the meaning as location principle. 
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Assuming SemNet is extended to include defined and observed events, the effect 
on this principle needs to be understood. 
For example, returning to the sentence: 
"Every mother has a brother each of whom owns a parrot." 
The SemNet representation given in figure 5.3 is repeated 2. 
M 
Figure 5.3: SemNet representation of the Brother, Mother Parrot sentence. 
The events can now be interpreted as follows: 
The statement: \/x3y(x <= M ->• (y £ B A BO(x, y))) 
defining Bx as: {x \ x € B A (3y(y G M A BO(x,y)))} 
i.e. brothers of a mother 
2 With M, B, B i , P, P i , O, and BO for M O T H E R , B R O T H E R , B R O T H E R 1 , P A R R O T , 
PARROT1 OWNS, and B R O T H E R - O F respectively 
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The statement: Va;3y(x € Bx - » (y 6 P A 0(ar ,y))) 
# 2 ^ - defining P j as: {x \ x £ P A (3y(y G 5 i A 0 ( y , x ) ) ) } 
I i.e. Parrots owned by a B\ 
E\ only observes for M and E2 only observes for B\. Otherwise the statements 
would be about mothers that have brothers, and brothers of mothers that own a 
parrot. 
This example seems to work well, but there are more problematic cases. Con-
sider again the donkey sentence, see figure 5.4. 
"Every farmer that owns a donkey beats i t " 
FARMER[U] DONKEYfU] 
spec spec 









Figure 5.4: SemNet graph for the 'donkey sentence' 
which i n the model defined would have interpretation: 
VzVy(.T <=FAyeDA 0(x, y)) -¥ B(x, y) 
where F is the subset of T> corresponding to farmers, D to donkeys, 0 to Owning 
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relations and B to Beating relations. As discussed earlier there has been much 
research into sentences w i t h this construction. The general problem is to find a 
satisfactory account for why i t is necessary to have a universal scoping for the owned 
(and therefore beaten) donkey, when in tu i t ion suggests i t should be an existential. 
SemNet seems more in tui t ive by representing the donkeys as existentials. Fig-
ure 4.5 is interpreted as: 
The statement: Vx3y(x G i * \ -> (y G D A 0(x,y))) 
Defines F i as: {x | x G F A (3y(y G D A 0(x, y)))} 
Ei \ i.e. 'farmers that own a donkey': 
Defines as: {a; | x G D A (3y(y G F A 0 ( y , x)))} 
i.e. 'donkeys owned by a farmer' 
E2 being an observed event makes no definitions. Naively i t would be inter-
preted as: 
E2 = Vx3y(x G F i ^ d / G D i A B(x,y)))} 
but this corresponds to saying that "every 'farmer that owns a donkey' beats 
a 'donkey owned by a farmer" ' . I t does not capture the additional aspect that 
'farmers beat the same donkey that they own' . I n SemNet there is a rule which 
allows the owned donkey to be extracted and referred to again. I n the model this 
corresponds to assuming a funct ion f (:i*\ —> Di) which given a 'donkey owning 
farmer' w i l l return 'the donkey the farmer owns', so that E<i can be defined as: 
E2 = Vx(x G Fi -> fl(x,/(&))) 
Therefore to replicate the way SemNet builds the meaning of the donkey sen-
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tence, a structure wi th a (witness extracting) funct ion such as f is needed 3. 
The formulat ion used so far does not distinguish statements of necessity. For 
example, the events of figure 4.6 
Ex = Vx{x e l 4 PLAYS{x, FOOTBALL)) 
< 
E2 = Vx{x e X STUDIES(x, Al)) 
are both ' t rue ' statements i n the semantics, and thus indistinguishable. To 
represent this behaviour a richer semantics is required. 
5.3 Possible World Semantics 
The set theoretic semantics defined so far are reasonable for capturing and analysing 
the extensional aspects of SemNet. However, in chapter 4, i t was claimed that 
SemNet defines concepts by their properties. This is close i n spirit to the definition 
of intensionality as discussed i n [Woods, 1991]. To add formal i ty to this claim, the 
semantic model should also be able to make this distinction. As discussed there 
are not many operations on SemNet that rely on these distinctions, however, this 
work now moves f r o m the realm of checking that the past work is well founded, to 
paving the way for future versions and algorithms which w i l l work on SemNet. 
The set theoretic model described in the previous section assumed a single 'real' 
world, where each proposition is either ' t rue ' or 'false', and each concept can be 
identified w i t h a single object or set of objects. 
The classical way [Meyer and der Hoek, 1995], [Moore, 1995], to define the 
intension of a concept is to postulate a set of situations (possible worlds), where 
that concept may have an extension. Two concepts are said to be intensionally 
equivalent i f and only i f they have the same extension in all the possible worlds. 
3 This could be done, but in section 7.2.2 it is shown that U T T provides just such a function, 
naturally. 
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Often there is a certain world ( intui t ively the 'real ' one, or the one which some agent 
believes in) distinguished, and two concepts are said to be extensionally equivalent 
i f and only i f they have the same extension in this 'real ' world. 
More formally, postulate a set of world W and a domain T>. The new semantic 
mapping functions M.VWSindex have types: 
• MVWSu : C£/ W P(V) 
• MVWS{ :CI->W^V 
• MVWSa :CA-*W P(V x V) 
• MVWSe : CE -»• W -> {true, false} 
A particular world wr G W is distinguished as 'real ' . The previous interpreta-
tions are now taken to be ' t rue ' in wr. 
5.3.1 Intensionality of Universals 
Returning to the example of figure 4.6, possible world semantics can be used to 
distinguish the ' intension' of the concept X f r o m its 'extension'. 
MVWSU(X) : W -> P(V) 
The defined event E i is interpreted as: 
Ww 6 W.Vx(x € MVWSu X w ^ PLAYS(x, FOOTBALL)) 
i.e. all instances play football in all possible worlds. 
The observed event E 2 is interpreted as: 
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Vx(x G MVWSu X wr -> STUDIES{x,AI)) 
i.e. all instances study A l i n the 'real ' world. A statement is said to be 'neces-
sarily true ' i f i t is ' t rue ' in al l possible worlds. 
The possible worlds interpretation succeeds in distinguishing the concepts, how-
ever, as before there seems to be a difference in the way the semantic language (now 
possible world structures) distinguish objects, and the way in which SemNet does 
(by the defining properties of nodes). I t would be more ideal i f the semantic lan-
guage could mimic this notion. 
A second problem is that possible worlds do have their l imitat ions, (albeit 
seemingly pathological). For example i t is easy to conceive mathematical cases 
of concepts which have the same extension in all possible worlds, and yet have 
different intensions, which manifest themselves occasionally. 
For example, consider the concepts: 
1. The first two natural numbers. 
2. The first two powers of 2. 
These w i l l both have the same extension in all possible worlds, i.e. { 1 , 2 } but 
they clearly have different intensions. 
5.3.2 Intensionality of Propositions 
As discussed earlier the extension of a proposition is just whether i t is true or false. 
In many cases inference only involves the extension of a proposition (event). As the 
' t r u t h ' of an event w i l l usually depend only on the t r u t h of other related events. 
However, there are cases where the intension (the idea formed by a mind using 
SemNet) of an event is important . 
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I n this case there are algorithms in SemNet which rely on these differences. For 
example, the epistemic events and associated inference rules. Naively epistemic 
actions (such as believes) are mapped to relations over the mappings of the events 
subject and object. I f the extensional interpretations of events is used this results 
in : 
Believes (->• T> x {true, false} 
so that any events that have the same t r u t h value i n the 'real ' world are indis-
tinguishable. Clearly this cannot account for the epistemic inference rules. 
To give a t r u t h theoretic account for epistemic events, the 'agent' (the concept 
w i t h the belief) is postulated to 'believe' that a subset of W are possible (and the 
rest are not) , and the 'agent' believes the event i f its interpretation is true i n all 
the worlds the agent deems as possible. 
More formally for each agent a (an individual concept, CI) there is a subset of 
W 4 defined by the semantic mapping funct ion MVWSi : CI -> P ( W ) . 
The meaning of an epistemic event can then be defined by the funct ion: 
M(Bel,A,I,E{) = \/v e (MVWSi(A)).MVWSe{Euv) 
Intui t ively this states that such an epistemic event is true i f and only i f E\ 
is true in all the worlds that the agent A deems possible. A l l defining events are 
mapped to statements which are ' t rue ' in all worlds, and so are necessarily believed 
by all agents. Hypothetical events must be ' t rue ' in some world. Observed events 
are ' t rue ' in the real world. 
The nodes in figure 4.4 can now be interpreted as: 
4Usually an agent is identified with a relation R„, and there is a notion of accessibility between 
worlds based on this relation 
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Roberto i-> RR0berto( a subset of W ) 
#x H> F ( : W->> {<r«e , /a / se} 
E2 l-> V t ) € RRoberto-F V 
Intui t ively, E2 is ' true' i f and only i f E\ is ' t rue ' i n all the worlds in Roberto-
Inference rules 4.11 and 4.13 can be shown sound w i t h respect to these seman-
tics. 
T h e o r e m 5.3.1 (Soundness of rule 4.11) For all A,B,C G CU 
(M(Bel(Agent, A h s B)) A M(Bel(Agent, B hs C))) 
M(Bel(Agent, A hs C)) 
P r o o f 
(M{Bel(Agent, A hs B)) A M(Bel(Agent, B hs C))) 
=» Bel(Agent, (A C B)) A Bel(Agent, (B C C ) ) 
Vttf G fl^en^A C B ) A V W € RAgent-(B C C ) 
^ V t O G i2>|ffen<.(A C C ) 
M(Bel(Agent, A hs C)) • 
T h e o r e m 5.3.2 (Soundness of rule 4.13.) For all events E G CE: 
M(Bel(Agent, ->E)) ~-{M{Bel(Agent, E))) 
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P r o o f 
MBel(Agent,->E) 
V«J G RAgent--'E 
3u; G RAgent-^E (assuming the agent believes i n a possible world) 
=> - ( V w G R A g e n t . E ) 
^MBel(Agent,E) • 
But w i t h rule 4.12 the situation is not so clear. There is nothing in the structure 
described so far that relates the ' t r u t h ' of an assertion in a world, and the ' t r u t h ' of 
an agent 'believing the assertion' i n this same world. Bu t there is nothing naturally 
recursive in the possible worlds framework to capture the 'c irculari ty ' of this rule. 
The system does not recognise all intensional differences. For example, all 
tautologies (facts) w i l l be true i n all possible worlds and so w i l l be indistinguishable, 
and yet intui t ively: 
I understand "2 + 2 = 4" 
I understand "Fermats' last theorem" 
should have different interpretations. I n SemNet when an event is definitional 
i t is a tautology, so possible worlds cannot distinguish between any of these, even 
when they are hypothetical. 
Finally as before, although in general the semantics does succeed in distinguish-
ing, what for SemNet are distinct concepts, i t does not do so in a similar way to 
SemNet. The in tu i t ion behind the epistemic events of SemNet is that their meaning 
comes f r o m their structure and relationship w i t h other concepts rather than requir-
ing an external set of worlds. A better model would map events to propositions 
which take their meaning more directly f r o m related interpreted concepts. 
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5»4 Distributedness 
For ease of notation, the semantic counterpart to any node X w i l l be wr i t ten as 
X M . 
Although the semantic model of SemNet has a very different structure f r o m 
SemNet, i t does s t i l l provide a formal model of the meaning of SemNet. Therefore, 
in theory, i t can be used to analyse the distributedness of SemNet. However, 
because the model considers SemNet as a list of events (rather than as a set of 
l inks), i t does not allow for analysis of meaning of subparts of events. Therefore 
distributedness can only be established at this level of granularity. 
The ' f u l l model of SemNet' is defined as 'the conjunction of meanings of the 
'real' events of the network'. From now on this w i l l be known as the f u l l model 
Mfuii. 
The 'meaning of a section of SemNet' is defined as the conjunction of meanings 
of the real events w i th in the section. From now on an interpretation for an arbitrary 
section 'S', w i l l be wr i t t en as M.section(S). 
Distributedness can be formal ly defined as: 
V S : SectionMjuii =>• Msection{S) 
The result (at this level) is t r i v i a l . Essentially the interpretation of the section 
postulates the existence of various concepts which M.provides. 
For example, i f the immediately adjacent nodes of an existential event are in-
terpreted, (R, true, A, U, B, E), the interpretation is ( in the 'real ' world): 
(AM,BM CV)A 
(RM C D 2 ) A 
\/x3y(x e AM -> (y € BM A RM(x, y)) 
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and clearly M.fuii w i l l contain a statement the same as this w i th A M , BM and 
RM f u l l y specified, so that: 
M full -> Msection(-#, i rue , A , £/, B, E) 
as required. 
Similarly for an epistemic event (Bel, A, Ei), the interpretation w i l l be: 
E™ G Statements^ 
AM C ( W x W ) A 
V™ G ( M ^ W S ^ A ) ) -> £ f * H 
for which the f u l l reading w i l l contain the above w i t h f ? f and AM f u l l y specified. 
5.4.1 Arc level analysis 
The above analysis was largely t r i v i a l , as the section interpretations were conjuncts 
of the f u l l reading. The in tu i t ion behind distributedness went much fur ther , claim-
ing that sub parts of events could be read independently and reliably. To show 
this, a formal interpretation to the sub-parts of events (i.e. arcs) must be given. I t 
is then shown that i f an arc a is part of an event E then Ai(E) M.(a), so that 
M. juii =^ M(a) and that SemNet is distributed at the level of the arcs. 
A n arc is interpreted as a an open proposition which when fu l l y read would 
fo rm one of a set of alternative propositions. For example interpreting a universal 
subject arc between and event E and an enti ty C, gives: 
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3R,X C,X CV,RCV xV 
Vc(c € C (3x(x e X A R(x, c))) 
V(Vx(x G X A R{x,c)))) 
V 
3R,X x e v , c CV,RCV xV 
Vc(ce C -> R{c,X)) 
and whatever the f u l l reading is, i t w i l l certainly imply the above situation (as 
i t w i l l be an expansion of one of the disjunction of situations). 
The above analysis is straightforward, but extremely messy. I t is improved i f 
quantification is moved onto the event. I n such a situation the controls of the event 
would state whether i t is 'real' or 'hypothetical ' , 'defined' or 'observed', and what 
the quantifications of the 'subject' and 'object ' are. For example, i f E were 'real ' , 
'observed', universal subject and individual object, the interpretation would be: 
The situation becomes complex again i f epistemic events are considered, as R 
and X w i l l have different 'types' i f E is epistemic. However, the results are s t i l l 
straightforward. Thus i t can be claimed that SemNet is distributed w i t h respect 
to these semantics. 
5.5 Review 
The classical approach to formalising SemNet has delivered many benefits. I t pro-
vides a rigourous and unambiguous way of understanding the meaning of SemNet 
structures. As outlined at the beginning this has resulted, i n general, improved 
3R,X: X eV,C CV,RCVxV 
Vc(cG C R(c,X)) 
C h a p t e r 5: Formal i sa t ion Issues 92 
understanding and presentation of SemNet. In addition the problem of ill-defined 
concepts has arisen. 
Soundness of reasoning and a semantic foundation for intensionality have been 
given. The interpretation given to defined and observed events has shown that 
their introduction w i l l affect the meaning as location principle. Overall problems 
w i t h the semantic model have been pathological and, perhaps, are not objections 
that w i l l lead to serious repercussions for N L E . 
The main problem w i t h the semantics is that i t captures the meaning in a 
different way f r o m SemNet. The main motivation for bui lding a semantic model 
in type theory is that there seem to be constructions which could allow for more 
direct interpretation of SemNet. 
Chapter 6 
Formalisation of SemNet in U T T 
This chapter describes how U T T is used in the formalisation of SemNet. I t is 
a major extension of the work described in [Shiu et ai, 1996]. Essentially the 
mechanism for defining theories as described in 3.4 is used to define syntactic 
(object) and semantic (meta) versions of SemNet, thus allowing modular reasoning. 
The internal logic of U T T is used to reason directly about these models. 
Two fur ther aspects of U T T which are exploited by this work are that i t is 
a programming language and so can be used to reason directly about the imple-
mentation of SemNet, and that the logic is supported by the proof assistant Lego 
[Pollack, 1989]. 
The a im is very much to show the applicability of the type theory framework, 
including use of the abstract theory mechanism and Lego, rather than to show that 
type theory is an appropriate semantic language. This latter task is postponed un t i l 
the next chapter. 
6.1 Framework of the Formalisation 
Figure 6.1 shows the four versions of SemNet, they are described as: 
C h a p t e r 6: Formal i sat ion of S e m N e t in U T T 94 
MPLEMENTED 
SEMNET 
I INTUITIVE \ 








Figure 6.1: Framework for the formalisation 
» Implemented SemNet refers to the actual Haskell data structures and as-
sociated functions that f o r m SemNet i n the L O L I T A system. 
• Intui t ive SemNet refers to the informal concept of SemNet that exists amongst 
the L O L I T A group members. This is what was described in chapter 4, i.e. 
the graphical structures and the declarative rules of inference. There is an 
informal l ink between this and the implemented SemNet, as this is what the 
designers had in mind as i t was bu i l t . 
e Syntac t i c SemNet refers to the abstract theory of U T T which defines Sem-
Net in U T T . I t consists of declarative rules of inference which correspond 
to the in tu i t ive SemNet, and algorithms (based on U T T as a programming 
language) that correspond closely to the implemented SemNet. This latter 
correspondence is informal but can be considered as closer than the other 
links as both algorithms are wr i t t en i n functional languages and so can be 
viewed in terms of lambda calculus. 
• Semant ic SemNet refers to the abstract theory of U T T which formal ly cap-
tures the intended meaning of SemNet i n U T T . There are functions of U T T 
which map between the syntactic and semantic SemNet and so this corre-
spondence is formal . 
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The U T T models are packaged as 'knowledge base theories' similar to the ab-
stract theory mechanism described in section 3.4. This allows a theory for a simple 
version of SemNet to be developed, and the results inherited by more complex 
versions. See figure 6.2. 
SYNTACTIC SEMNET 1 









-** Type Theoretic 
Semantics 
SYNTACTIC SEMNET3 
(basic events added) 
Type Theoretic 
Semantics 
Figure 6.2: Abstract theories of SemNet 
The abstract 'knowledge base theory' type is: 
KBT 
w f f : Type 
kb: w f f - + Bool 
IR: wff—> Prop 
The wff type represents objects which make legal statements. The kb type 
represents a distinguished set of these 'statements' which are explici t ly included in 
the knowledge base. The I R type represents the declarative inference rules for the 
theory, thus establishing which 'statements' are entailed by the 'knowledge base'. 
I R w i l l be defined by a set of functions irindex one for each inference rule. 
A separate predicate over the K B T type is used to ensure that the knowledge 
base meets any specified requirements. 
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cond : KBT —> Prop 
I n this work this is used to ensure that the specialisation events f o r m a legal 
hierarchy, but i t could be used for other properties, e.g. to ensure consistency. 
To prove soundness and completeness theorems, i t needs to be assumed that 
the I R functions are the only way in which such propositions can arise. Therefore 
the rules are defined as inductive relations, and the corresponding elimination rule 
can be inferred as discussed in 3.1.4. 
Functions that (are intended to) implement the inference rules can be converted 
to functions in U T T (Lego) w i t h type: 
Soundness and completeness of the implementation of the rules are defined by 
the propositions 1: 
Proving soundness would show that F (the functional algori thm) w i l l only f ind 
proofs that follow f r o m IR (the inference rules) and completeness would show that 
F w i l l f i nd all possible proofs based on IR. They should not be confused soundness 
and completeness w i t h respect to type theoretic semantics. 
Type theoretic semantics are defined by meaning functions w i t h types: 
1iscase : Bool —> Prop 
F:Uk: KBT.wff[k] Bool 
Soundlmp 
Complmp 
= Uk : KBT.Ilw : wff{k).iscase(F{k,w)) -> IR[k](w) 
= Uk : KBT.Uw : wff[k].IR[k](w) -» iscase(F(w,k)) 
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Mkb • KBT Prop 
M w f j :Uk : K B T . w f f [ k ] ^ Prop 
Soundness and completeness of the rules w i t h respect to the type theoretic 
semantics are defined by: 
SoundSem = Ilk : KBT.Ilw : wff[k].IR[k](w) -> (Mkb -> Mw}i[k](w)) 
CompSem = lik : KBT.TLw : w f f [ k ] . ( M k b -> MwfJ[k](w)) -> IR[k]{w) 
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Propos i t ional C a l c u l u s E x a m p l e 
To define a simple version of propositional calculus, (w i th only nega-
t ion and implicat ion symbols). The wf f type would be defined induc-
tively w i t h two constructors: 
w f f : Type 
Pi : w f f ( i G Nat) 
: w f f ->• w f f -> w f f 
: w f f ->• w f f 
I f the only inference rules are that a wf f is explici t ly in the knowledge 
base, or i t is inferred by modus ponens, then inference is defined by 
the inductive relation: 
w f f —>• Prop 
UP : wff.iscase(kb(P)) -» IR(P) 
UP, Q : w f f . I R ( P ) -> IR(=> (P, Q) -> IR(Q) 
To prove an implementation of the inference rules, F , is complete there 
are two cases to prove: 
UP : wff.iscase(kb(P)) ->• iscase(F(P)) 
UP,Q : wff.iscase{F(P)) -+ iscase{F(=> (P,Q)) ->• iscase(F(Q)) 
and similarly to prove the semantics sound: 
nP : wff.iscase(kb(P)) -> (Mkb(kb) -> M w f J { P ) ) 
UP,Q : w f f . I R ( P ) IR{=> (P,Q) -+ ( M M ( A : & ) -> M*,//((})) 
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E x a m p l e continued 
Let p c i : K B T be the theory defined earlier and suppose that a new 
' w f f constructor' is to be added for conjunction: 




wff\pci] -> w f f 2 
w f f 2 ->• w f f 2 ->• w f f 2 
Essentially wf f\pc\\ is a subtype of wf f 2 w i t h e as coercion. A knowl-
edge base can be defined which extends fc6[pci] i n the natural way. 
Further inference rules can be added for the 'new' wff ' s 
IR\pc2]{P) 
» ' » W :IIP,Q: wff\pc2].IR[pc2](n(P, Q)) -+ IR\pc2](P) 
ir2,andr :UP,Q: wff\pc2}.IR\pc2}(n{P, Q)) -> IR\pc2](Q) 
I n this way a new object pc2 : K B T , can be defined which is a natural 
extension of pc\. 
I n the formulat ion of SemNet, wff ' s defined in later/complex versions do not 
effect those defined in earlier/simpler versions. Because of this when a version of 
SemNet is extended to handle richer structures (wff 's and inference rules) a new 
and separate K B T object is defined, and sits alongside the original. 
KBT2 = 
ki : KBT 
k2 : KBT 
k2 is defined in terms of objects and structures of k\, but the properties of k\ 
itself are not affected. Properties proved about ki are then t r iv ia l ly inherited to 
objects of type KBT2. 
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As well as being a formal and declarative description of SemNet, the syntac-
tic model is a formal bridge between the implementation and the type theoretic 
semantics. I t allows a formal mapping to the semantic model to be defined, and 
for reasoning about (abstracted, but very close) versions of the algorithms used on 
SemNet. 
The semantic SemNet models are a formal representation of the meaning of 
SemNet structures. They correspond to the set theoretic model developed in chap-
ter 5. 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to describing the structure of these 
models, although of course extensive appeal to the intui t ive SemNet w i l l be made 
to keep the reader aware of which aspects are being formalised. 
6.2 A simple Hierarchy - SemNeti 
In this model only universal (CU) nodes and specialisation events between them 
are considered. The wf / 's w i l l be the links, the structure conditions ensure the 
links f o r m a hierarchy, and the reasoning rules w i l l correspond to rules 4.1 and 4.2. 
6.2.1 Syntax for SemNeti 
The only pr imi t ive needed for this structure w i l l be a node type, C U . Specialisation 
links are defined as 3-tuples CU x CU x Bool. The entries representing subject, 
object and polari ty of the statement respectively. 
For example, (Man, Mammal , true) represents the statement "men are mam-
mals" . 
The knowledge base (a funct ion of type w f f - » Bool) is implemented via a 
list of links and a membership funct ion. To fo rm a hierarchy there must be a 
designated ' top ' node and a proof that all the other nodes are 'below' this node. 
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More formally w i t h s x = SemNetx ( : K B T ) , 
CU : Type 
topSl : CU 
w f f S l = CU xCU x Bool 
KSl = l i s t ( w f f S l ) (i.e. a list of 3-tuples) 
kbai (w) = member w Kai 
condSl K = P(KSl,topSx) 
where, w is of type w f f S l , member is the usual list membership function, P is a 
predicate that ensures K forms a hierarchy and that topSl is the top node. 
The inference rules (corresponding to the declarative rules 4.1 and 4.2) are 
defined inductively: 
IRSl : w f f S l ->• Prop 
ir : Ilw:wffSl.(iscase(kbSl(w)))—>IRSl(w) 
in : TlA,B,C:CU.{IRSl(A,B,true))->(IRSl(B,C,true)) 
->• {IR8l(A,C,true)) 
ir2 : IIA,B,C :CU.{IRS1(A, B, true)) ^ (IRSi(A,C, false)) 
->• (IRSl(B,C, false)) 
ir states that any event present i n the knowledge base can be inferred. ir\ 
states that 'positive' spec links are transitive. ir2 states that 'negative' spec links 
can be inferred i n a similar way 2 
6.2.2 Implementation Analysis for SemNeti 
The algorithms for adding Links to SemNet and for inferr ing Links f rom SemNet 
can be given counterparts i n Lego. A problem in converting algorithms is that 
2 The Lego module for handling inductive types does not pattern match against the link type, 
and so a function for building the link type is used. 
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U T T is a decidable language and all algorithms must terminate. Therefore gen-
eral recursive functions need to be converted ( i f possible) to well founded versions 
[Wand, 1992], [Hoffman, 1992]. 
I n this work the method used (as described in [Wand, 1992]) is to provide an 
explicit complexity measure which reduces on each recursive call to the funct ion. 
W i t h this in m i n d the structural condition type for SemNeti included a com-
plexity measure funct ion: 
wSl : CU -> Nat 
which has constraints: 
wSl top = 1 
RA.wSl A < wSl (Gen A) 
where Gen :CU —>• C U , is a funct ion defined on SemNeti which returns the 
node immediately above in the hierarchy. 
w is used by all functions that search up and down the hierarchy recursively. 
For example, i n pseutlo Haskell notation: 
AllUp : CU -+ [CU] 
AllUp top = [top] 
AllUp A = cons A (AllUp (Gen A) 
is actually implemented using w on each CU to ensure that the recursive func-
t ion w i l l reach the top node and terminate. 
The inference funct ion is defined as: 
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I n f t -»• Bool 
In f S l (A, B, true) =Ae AllUp B 
(A , B, false) = A <E AllDown (NotGen B) 
where AllDown : CU -> [CU] searches down rather than up the hierarchy, and 
NotGen : CU —» CU returns a node ( i f there is one) which is explici t ly not its 
generalisation. 
6.2.3 Semantics for SemNeti 
Previously CU nodes were interpreted as sets and spec links as subset relations. 
Analogously i n type theory nodes w i l l be interpreted as types and the links as 
subtype judgements. 
As discussed in chapter 3 subtyping is a current research topic for type theory. 
I n this section when one type A , is said to be a subtype of another B , B >z A , then 
i t is assumed that there is an impl ic i t coercion K : A —> B between them and a:A, 
can operate as an object of type B , wi thout the need to specify that the object 
used is really « ( a ) , [Luo, 1996]. 
In tu i t ive ly each node is interpreted in terms of its parent node and the events its 
involved in (not present i n this case). The top node is interpreted as an arbitrary 
type T . Since the events are not present, the predicates can only be impl ic i t . They 
are defined by an impl ic i t funct ion ImpPred : CU —> (T -> Prop). 
A l l nodes are then defined i n terms of their impl ic i t predicate and the predicates 
of all their parents. More formal ly : 
M u CU -+ Type 
M u top = T 
M u n : T.(Mpl n) x 
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where 
M p i : CU -> ( T ->• Prop) 
-M.pl top = Xx : T.true 
M p i A = Xx : T . ( M p l ((Gen x) x)) A (ImpPred A x) 
From now on, where the meaning is clear, subscripting w i l l be used to represent 
the semantic interpretation of syntactic structures. For example, A m w i l l represent 
M.u A , and Aprei w i l l represent ImpPredA. 
I n t u i t i v e E x a m p l e 
The node for M A M M A L which appears below animal i n the hierarchy 
(see figure 4.10) w i l l be interpreted as: 
MAMMALm = Ex : T.MAMMALpred(x) 
i.e. an instance of a M A M M A L is an object of type T , together 
w i t h a proof that this object meets all the requirements for being a 
M A M M A L . The requirements are encoded in MAMMALpred which 
is defined as: 
MAMMALpred = Xx : T.ANIMALpred(x) A PredMAMMAL(x) 
where ANIMALpred specifies conditions for being an animal (i.e. an 
organised being endowed w i t h l ife, sensation and voluntary motion) , 
and MAMMALpred specifies further conditions for being a mammal 
(i.e. has mammae for nourishment of young). 
Intui t ively M.p\ should map to a predicate, i.e. T —> Prop, but in some cases a 
witness extraction funct ion is required, see section 7.2. Where possible a shorthand 
notation for expressing semantic counterparts of concepts, i.e. the subscripted 
notation given above. 
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The coercive funct ion between the meaning of a node and its 'parent' is a 
forgetful map that forgets the node specific predicate. 
The links of the syntax are the statements and so map to objects of type Prop. 
As constructed they map to the judgement that the two types are i n a subtype 
relation, or not as the case may be. This is a 'higher t r u t h ' i n the sense that such 
judgements are axioms in type theory, however i t is helpful for the analysis i f a 
proposition can be extracted f r o m the judgement, and so links are interpreted as 
follows: 
M spec 
: w f f S l -»• Prop 
MSpec (A, B, true) = Rx : Bm.Bpred x ->• A p r e d x 
Mspec {A, B, false) — 3x : B m . ( B p r e d x) A -<(Apred x) 
The in tu i t ion here is that when a spec occurs the predicate of a node w i l l entail 
that of its parent (clearly true for mammals and animals, see above example). 
The meaning of the whole network is the conjunction of the meanings of the 
links of the knowledge base. 
Mkb • KS1 Prop 
Mkb k = Avtuefc wm 
Soundness of S e m N e t i 
Soundness of the inference rules w i t h respect to the semantics is characterised in 
the following: 
T h e o r e m 6.2.1 (Soundness of Spec Inher i tance) 
Uw : w f f S l . I R S l ( w ) -> K 
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P r o o f 
This is an informal version of the Lego proof. 
Assume (introduce) k : kbsi, w : wf f S x . Proceed by induction on the structure 
of IRSx. There are 3 cases: 
C a s e 1 : ir 
ir =>• iscase (kbSl w) 
=>• w m £ k m 
=> k m w m 
C a s e 2 : iri w = (A,C,true) 
tVi => 3B:CU. ( IR (A,B, t rue) and I R (B,C,true)) 
k m -». 
( A , B , t r u e ) m A ( B , C , t r u e ) m 
=> k m -»• 
( I I x : B m . ( B p r e ( i x ) ->• ( A p r e d x) 
A 
( I I x : C T O . ( C p r e ( i x) - » ( B p r e ( i ) x) 
k m -> 
(n x : C m . ( C p r e ( i x ) —> (Apred x) 
k m w m 
C a s e 3 : zr 2 similar to case 2! • . 
Completeness of SemNetx 
The Completeness theorem is characterised in : 
Ilw : u ; / / [ s 1 ] . ( A ' [ a i ] m -> w m ) -»• 7# [ s i ] (w) 
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This has not been proved. Wi thou t this result i t is not known that all entail-
ments (that follow f r o m the rules of U T T ) would be realised by the spec inference 
rules of SemNeti . Lacking this result does not, of course, invalidate the meaning of 
the soundness result above, i.e. that all proofs i n SemNeti are valid w i t h respect 
to U T T . 
6.2.4 SemNeti discussion 
SemNeti is a concrete realization of the framework shown in figure 6.1. There 
has been a thorough attempt to analyse al l the aspects discussed in 6.1. There 
are syntactic and semantic versions of the enti ty hierarchy of 4.6.1 w i t h functions 
between them providing a formal interpretation, and algorithms that correspond 
to the implemented code of L O L I T A . The logic of U T T has been used to reason 
directly about this model. 
The semantics defined may seem disproportionately complicated w i t h respect to 
the in tu i t ive ly simple enti ty hierarchy, especially when compared w i t h the straight-
forward subset interpretation. The motivat ion for using type theory was to exploit 
its ' intensionality' . Because i t is intensional i t is less natural to use i t to model 
the 'extensional' behaviour of inheritance. However, the soundness result shows 
that the interpretation does f i t w i t h the in tu i t i on T and that i t is reasonable t o bui ld 
fur ther semantic structure to reason about richer aspects of SemNet. This has 
significance beyond pure inheritance as these rules are used many times over by 
other inference algorithms and other modules. 
I n this model i t has been possible to bu i ld counterparts to L O L I T A functions 
and to reason about their behaviour. A n abstracted version of the inference al-
gor i thm for spec events has been bui l t and is available for analysis. However, the 
problem of dealing w i t h general recursion adds a significant amount of work to this 
process. Since more complex structures can only mean more problems, and this 
for code that is used less often, i t was decided, based on pragmatic grounds, no 
further implementation analysis would be done. 
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6o3 Individuals and Instance events - SernNet2 
In tu i t ive ly this abstraction is SemNeti w i t h instance events and individual con-
cepts. The only new pr imi t ive is the Individual node type (CI ) . The new w f f 
type 'Instance' links w i l l also be defined as 3-tuples, CU x CI x Bool, for example 
(Man,Roberto,true) represents the statement "Roberto is a man". The new knowl-
edge base w i l l be a list of the new l ink type, there are no structural conditions. 
The inference rules w i l l correspond to rules 4.3 and 4.4. 
6.3.1 SemNet2 Syntax 
More formally: 
CI Type 
( s i , s 2 ) S2 = 
where si is defined as i n 6.2 and: 
: KBT 
w f f S 2 =CU x C I x Bool 
KS2 •• [ w f f S 2 ] 
kbSo w = Member w K. 
The new rules corresponding to rules 4.3 and 4.4 are defined by 
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w f f 3 2 -»• Prop 
Uw : wffS2.iscase(kbS2(iv)) -» IRS2(w) 
IIA,B: CU.Ua : CI.IRS2(A,a,true) -+ IRSl(B, A, true) 
—> IRS2(B,a,true) 
LL4, B : CU.Ua : CI.IRS2{A, a, false) ->• IRSl {A, B, true) 
—>• IRS2(B,a, false) 
Note that IRS2 is defined in terms of IRSl but not vice versa. Precisely the 
same functions are used to implement inference on si, so that results are clearly 
inherited. 
I n f l A = I n f , Orl(S 2 ))) 
New functions inferring Inst links are defined: 
Inf2,s2 • w f f S 2 ->• Bool 
6.3.2 Semantics for SemNet2 
Continuing the analogy wi th set theory, individuals w i l l be interpreted as objects 
(of types) and Inst events as typing judgements. Once again there w i l l be some 
work to extract propositions out of the judgements. 
The individuals are interpreted as being (arbitrary, but specified) objects of 
their 'parent' type, but which are also objects of an impl ic i t subtype defined by the 
defining event. This assumes that this subtype, is non-empty and that an arbitrary 
member can be selected. This is not possible for all types (or else all propositions 
would be provable and the logic inconsistent). However the type of non-empty 
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NonEmpty = S T : Type.T 
and a choice funct ion C can be defined for this type: 
C : UN : NonEmpty.N 
C N = T T 2 N 
Throughout this section i t w i l l be assumed that all Nodes w i t h an instance l ink 
w i l l be interpreted as NonEmpty types so that the funct ion C can be applied. 
The semantic functions are defined as: 
Mu,s2 : CU -> Type 
Mu<s2 A = M U } S 1 A 
MtyPe,s2 • CI -» Type 
Mtype,S2 a = T,X : T.aprec[ X 
M i i S 2 •• Tlx : CI.MtyPe,s2 x 
A^,-,52 a = C a t y p e 
Ms,s2 : w f f i s i ] -+ Prop 
Ms,s2 w = Ms,Sl w 
Mi,s2 • w f f s 2 -»• Prop 
Mi,s2 (A, a, true) = a p r e d (am) 
Mi,s2 (A, a, false) = -^apred (am) 
where a p r e (/ is given by an impl ic i t funct ion for the impl ic i t defining event. 
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Intui t ive E x a m p l e 
Taking an instance of the CU node D O G (wi th name F I D O , as in 
figure 4.10). 
FIDOm = C{Zx : T.FIDOpred(x)) 
where 
FIDOpred = Xx : T.DOGpred(x) A PredFIDO{x) 
i.e. FIDOm is an object of type T , together w i t h a proof that this 
object 'obeys' the 'being a dog' predicate and the 'being F I D O ' pred-
icate. 
Theorems proved for SemNeti are inherited as discussed. Further theorems for 
irZ and irA are that the code implements them soundly and that they are sound 
wi th respect to the type theoretic semantics. 
6.3.3 SemNet2 discussion 
As discussed in 6.2.3 no further analysis of L O L I T A algorithms has been done. 
However, the new rules defined by IR[s2] are defined in terms of IR[si] and the 
results of analysing the implementation of IR[si] are relevant to this model. 
There are two comments to make on the semantics. Firstly, to note that this 
semantic model merely extends the hierarchy w i t h fur ther extensional aspects. The 
domain V of set theory has been replaced w i t h an arbitrary type T . However, i t 
is interesting that a 'choice' funct ion has been required. Up un t i l now types have 
been entirely arbitrary, but by specifying that some types are inhabited, and that 
arbitrary objects can be chosen f r o m these types two assumptions have been made. 
First there is an commitment that these non-empty types correspond to objects 
that 'exist in the real wor ld ' i n some sense. Second, the use of a choice funct ion 
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corresponds to assuming the 'axiom of choice' of ZF set theory [Fraenkel and Bar-
Hi l le l , 1958]. This axiom is provable wi th in type theory [Mart in-Lof, 1982] (since 
i t is constructive). The point is noted as an aspect of SemNet that assumes some 
essence of 'constructivism'. I n chapter 7, fur ther observations along these lines are 
made. 
6.4 Standard Events - SemNet3 
The next abstraction includes the basic events. Basic events are all defining and 
real. They include all the possible quantification combinations. 
There are two new pr imi t ive types CA and CE. There is a choice in level of 
abstraction i n deciding how to bui ld the syntactic statements (u>// 's) . Either to 
ignore the substructure of events and define SemNet3 as a list of events or to model 
the implemented SemNet directly, as a set of subject, object and action links, w i t h 
events extracted f r o m out of these links. 
Choice 1 has the advantage of comprehend-ability and manageability. 
Choice 2 allows for proper modelling, but in tu i t ion is lost. Also the rules were 
specified for events not for links, and so to keep w i t h the knowledge base structure 
events must be abstracted out. 
As an attempt to get the best of both worlds, the model is f irst detailed as a set 
of links, as i t is done in L O L I T A . Events are then abstracted out of this structure 
and these f o r m the knowledge base. 
6.4.1 SemNet 3 - Syntax 
More formally: 
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CA : Type 
CE : Type 
SemNet3 = S3 = (si,s2,s3) : KBT3 
where s\ and 52 are defined as i n 6.2 and 6.3 and s3 is defined as follows: 






CE -> (CU \CI)->Q-+ Link 
CE -> (CU \CI)-*Q-> Link 
CE^CA-> Bool Link 
w i t h Q a type for quantification tags. A Net is then a sum type: 
Net = Era : (list(Link)).P(n) 
where P is a predicate that ensures that the links fo rm legal events. 
A n inductive type (for what w i l l be the new i w / / S 3 ' s ) is defined: 
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Event Type(0) 
Euu CU --> CU ->• CA-> Bool Event 
Eue CU -->CU ^ C A ^ Bool --> Event 
Eeu CU - CU ->• C A ->• Boo/ --> Event 
Eiu : C I -> C t / ->• C A -> 5oo/ -•> Event 
Eui : CU-->CI^CA^> Bool -•> Event 
Eii : C I ->CI->CA-^ Bool -• Event 
The knowledge base k b S 3 w i l l be extracted f r o m Ne t S 3 as the set of events that 
are explici t ly present. The new inference rules, corresponding to rules 4.5 - 4.8, are 
defined inductively. For example for rule 4.5: 
IRS3 : Event -> Prop 
ir5 : TLA, B, C : CU.UR : CA.Ubb : Bool. 
(IRS3 (Euu A C R bb)) -> (IR3l (A, B, true)) 
IRS3 (Euu B C R bb) 
Note that this rule uses, but does not affect, IR[ s i ] . The previous functions for 
inferring on the hierarchy can be-used. I n theory inference functions could be bui l t 
for this model, but for pragmatic reasons this has not been done, see discussion at 
the end of this chapter. 
6.4.2 SemNet3 Semantics 
As w i t h the set theoretic model, actions w i l l be left as impl ic i t relations (over the 
top type T ) . 
M 3 : CA -> (T -> T -> Prop) 
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(6.1) 
In this interpretation CU and C I w i l l be interpreted as before, except that 
the events w i l l be used to bui ld the M.v predicates. Events w i l l be interpreted as 
propositions. More formal ly: 
M : Event -» Prop 
M (Euu A B R bb) = Ux : Am.Uy : Bm. 
Rm x y 
M (Eue A B R bb) = Ux : Am3y : Bm. 
R m x y 
M (Eeu A B R bb) = Uy : Bm3x : Am. 
R m x y 
M. (Eiu a A R bb) — Ux : Am.Rm am x 
M. (Eui A a R bb) = Ux : Am.Rm x am 
M (EH a b R bb) = R 
As well as all the quantification cases there w i l l be separate functions defining 
predicates, dependent on whether the concept is use as a subject or an object by 
the defining event. Its type w i l l be: 
Predi : Event (T Prop) 
assuming that the concept is the subject of an event which has 'universal sub-
ject ' and 'existential object ' then the predicate is defined as: 
Pred^EueiA.B^R.bb) = ILc : T3y : Bm.Rm(x,y) (6.2) 
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Intu i t ive E x a m p l e 
For example, consider again the nodes in figure 4.1, 
Elm = ILr : Flm3y : Dlm.Om x y 
where 
Flm = Ex : T.Fpred(x) A (3y : Dm.Om(x,y)) 
Dlm = Ex : T.Dpred(x) A (3y : Fm.Om{y,x)) 
i.e. an object of type F\m is an object of type T paired w i t h a proof 
that i t 'obeys' the predicate for 'being a farmer' (i.e. F p r e d ) and i t 
'obeys' the predicate for 'owning a donkey' (as defined by the event 
E l ) . 
Elm makes the statement that each of these objects 'owns' an object 
of type Di. I t does this without using any logical connectives such as 
—» and A which were used in the set theoretic counterpart, see section 
5 .1. 
Soundness of the basic rules 4.1 and 4.2 can be ' inherited' f r o m the results of 
SemNetl and SemNet2. 
T h e o r e m 6.4.1 (Soundness of rule universal inheri tance) 
UA, B, C : Node.UR : CA.Ubb : Bool. [M(Euu AC R bb)) 
-» (M{A,B,true)) 
->• M(Euu B C Rbb) 
P r o o f 
This is an informal version of the Lego proof. 
Assume (introduce) A ,B ,C:CU; bb:Bool; 
HI : ILc : AmUy : Cm.Rm(nl(x),irl(y)y, 
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H2 : Ilx : T B p r e d ( x ) -> Apred(x); 
b : Bm = T,x : T.Bpred(x); 
c '. Cm — Sa; : T .Cpred(x) 
The new goal is to prove ( f ind a term of type) : 
Rm(irl(b),irl(c)) 
From the assumptions we can bui ld an object of type Am: 
a = (TT1(6), # 2 ( 7 r l ( & ) , TT2(6))) 
and then 
Hl{a,c) : ^ ( 7 1 - 1 ( 6 ) , T T 1 ( C ) ) 
as required • . 
6.4.3 SemNet3 discussion 
I n this model the previously impl ic i t predicates have been made explicit (by being 
defined in terms of the defining events). The only remaining ' impl ic i t ' objects are 
the postulated domain type T , and the relations over these (T x T —> Prop) that 
correspond to actions. 
Although the hierarchy interpretations may have seemed less in tui t ive than their 
set theoretic counterparts, the reverse could be said for basic event interpretations. 
For example, there are no logical connectives used in an interpretation for a basic 
event. This is expanded in chapter 7. 
In tui t ively theorem 6.4.1 is straightforward. I t states that i f something holds for 
all objects of a type, then i t holds for al l objects of subtypes of this type. I t should 
be straightforward, as the in tu i t ion behind the inheritance is straightforward. The 
result gives fur ther evidence that the semantic model given does actually capture 
the intended meaning of SemNet. 
The only change required to handle defined and observed events i n the above 
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model is to label some links 3 as observed. Semantically, the corresponding events 
would be mapped to propositions in the same way, but would produce vacuous 
(i.e. always true) predicates so that the interpretation of entities is not effected. 
Because of the problem of recursive definitions (see section 5.1), Euu events cannot 
be defining for both the subject and the object. 
6.5 Epistemic events - SemNet4 
To treat epistemic events as a new w f f type, there must be a new primitive 
type, CEE and a corresponding new link type for those links involving CEE nodes. 
As with SemNet3 a new inductive type is defined and legal epistemic events are 
extracted from a set of 'new' links. 
Correspondingly condS 4 wil l need rules to ensure that a given network (list of 
links) corresponds to a set of legal epistemic events. Finally of course IR S 4 wil l 
define rules corresponding to 4.11. 
6.5.1 SemNet4 Syntax 
More formally: 
CEE : Type 
CEA : Type 
The new link type is defined inductively: 
3Since an event could be defining for its subject, but not for its object. 





CEE -> (CU | CI) EpLink 
CEE -> {CU | C7) -> EpLink 
CEE -)• C £ A -»• tfpimfc EpAction 






CI -»• u>// S l -» Boo/ -> EpEvent 
CI -+ w f f S 2 ->• Boo/ -» EpEvent 
CI ->CE -> Boo/ EpEvent 
CI -»• C E E -»• Boo/ -> EpEvent 
The inference rules for 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13 are defined by: 
7B S 4 : EpEvent —• Prop 
»Vn : no : C/.IIA, B, C : CU.IR(EEspec a (A, B, true) true)) -» 
IR(EEspec a (B, C, true) true) ->• 
IR(EEspec a (A, C, true) true)) 
»>i2 : na : C/.IIe : CE.IR (EEbasic a e true)-> 
iris : Ua : CI.Tie : CE.IR (EEbasic a -e true)->> 
IR (EEbasic a e false) 
The semantics of SemNet4 involves exploiting the intensionality of Prop. It is 
postponed to the next chapter. 
IR (EErec a (EEbasic a e true) true) 
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6.6 Review 
Performing a formalisation of this size is a large and complicated task. This chapter 
has shown that the techniques and tools of type theory can help to break such 
problems and allow modular and machine assisted development of ideas and proofs. 
The closeness of UTT code and Haskell code did allow for some formal analysis 
of LOLITA algorithms, although because of the difficulties of recursion, this is only 
feasible from an engineering standpoint i f there is a serious need. 
The basic syntactic and semantic models have now been defined. Chapter 
7 takes the semantic model and the motivation that there are many similarities 
between SemNet and UTT to analyse some of the richer aspects of SemNet. 
Chapter 7 
Formal type theoretic semantics 
As outlined in the opening chapters, much of this research was motivated by the 
idea that the constructive and intensional aspects of type theory would make it 
a suitable semantic language for analysing SemNet. This chapter describes how, 
because of these aspects, the semantic models developed in chapter 6 are able to 
model SemNet more directly than set theory. 
7.1 Type theoretic intuitions 
The starting point for building a set theoretic model in chapter 5, was the intuition 
that the entity hierarchy formed a set hierarchy. I f instead events are considered 
first, it is observed that the interpretations are mainly of the form: 
Vx.x G A -> (...) 
3x.x e A A (...) 
This suggests that the underlying form for the logic is sorted, and that the 
intended statement is about all objects of 'sort A ' rather than all objects in some 
universe. In chapter 6, this more intuitive interpretation has been achieved. 
Chapter 7: Formal type theoret ic semantics 122 
It may seem that the subtyping scheme described in chapter 6 is more complex 
and less intuitive than viewing the hierarchy as a partial order defined by the 
subset relation. But this is not really so, as the type theoretic interpretations can 



















Figure 7.1: The 'semantic' type hierarchy. 
Each type corresponds to a 'subset' of the type T, together with a proof of some 
property about each of the objects in the subset. Thus the interpretation preserves 
the intuition of the subset relation and carries further structure which is exploited 
by other aspects of the model. 
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7 o 2 Defined and Observed Events 
As with the set theoretic model (see section 5.2) the observed events do not affect 
the definition (i.e. meaning) of refered subjects and objects. Thus as was concluded 
with the set theoretic model i f observed events are introduced to SemNet then 
the meaning as location principle only applies as far as defining events. A fuller 
discussion is given in section 8.1.1. 
Intuitively the CU nodes of SemNet represent noun phrases in natural language. 
The 'defined' events define such nodes and the 'observed' events refer back to them. 
In section 3.6 it was shown how dependent types are able to model this 'progression' 
which manifests itself many times in natural language. In section 6.2 CU nodes 
were interpreted as £ types of the form 
S[s : T,jt)i : Pi(x), : Pn(x)} 
with Pi-.T-t Prop1. 
With this interpretation, each of the predicates can be referred to by 'future' 
UTT statements in the same way as was done in section 3.6. 
However, Ranta uses Martin-Lof's type theory, which uses the S type directly 
as a 'constructive' existential quantifier. This was used to interpret the 'donkey 
sentence', see equation 3.1. It turns out that to model 'directly' the way in which 
SemNet represents this sentence the same quantifier is needed. Therefore a slight 
change in the interpretation is needed. 
For a universal-existential event the defining predicate needs to allow the exis-
tential 'witness' to be extracted. To allow this instead of interpreting as in equa-
tion 6.2, it is interpreted as: 
1The predicates were actually packaged together as a conjunction, but this does not affect our 
present purpose. 
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Pred2{Eue A B R bb) = \x : T.(Sy : Bm.Rm(x,y)) 
This means that the type changes, ( P r e ^ : Event —> (T —> Type)). But the 
proposition given in equation 6.2 can be extracted so that the soundness results 
proved in chapter 6 still hold. 
From now on CU nodes will be interpreted as: 
where Qi : T Type. Moreover the initial segment can be packaged as a single 
type, so that the node for, say, a mammal can be written as: 
7.2.1 Basic observing events 
In section 5.2 an attempt to model the SemNet representation of the 'donkey sen-
tence' was given. In type theory the analysis follows the same lines, the 'predicate' 
for an event is only used if the event is defining for the entity concept. For example, 
the nodes of figure 5.3 are interpreted as: 
E[.x : T,qt : Qi(x) , ...,qn : Qn(x)} 
Ere : Animalm.Mammalpre(i(x) 
El { 
The statement: Ux : M3y : B.BO{x, y) 
Every mother has a brother, 
defining B l as: Ex : B.T,y : M.BO{y, x) 
Brothers of a mother. 
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E2 H->> i 
The statement: Tlx : Bl.By : P.O(x,y) 
Every 'brother of a mother' owns a parrot, 
defining P I as: Ex : P.Zy : Bl.O{y,x) 
Parrots owned by a 'brother of a mother'. 
7.2.2 Complex observing events 
Interpreting the donkey sentence graph 
In section 5.2 it was shown that to replicate the way in which SemNet builds the 
meaning of the 'donkey sentence' a witness extracting function is needed. Since 
UTT (via the Strong sum type, and its associated projection functions) has such 
a function the SemNet graph can be handled directly: 
El I (7.1) 
The statement: Ux : F1.3y : D.O(x,y) 
Every F l owns a donkey, 
defining F l as: Ea; : F.Ey : D.O(x,y) 
Farmers that own a donkey, 
defining D l as: Ex : D.T,x : F.O(x,y) 
Donkeys owned by a farmer. 
As before, intuitively E2 should be interpreted as "Fl's beat the donkey that 
they own". This time, because of the constructive nature of type theory, the witness 
of the existential can be extracted: 
E2 i—y Ux : FI.B(X,TT1(TT2(X))) (7.2) 
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Complex Actions 
Although this may seem an esoteric example, which does not affect the general 
working of LOLITA, there is an immediate application. A current design problem 
is how to capture 'structural' facts about actions. For example, the action 'is 
ancestor o f is transitive, and the action 'is cousin o f is symmetric. Such rules are 
easy to specify in TOVC. 
A relation R is transitive if and only if: 
VxVyVz((R(x, V) A R(y, z)) => R(x, z)) (7.3) 
A relation R is symmetric i f and only if: 
VxVy(R(x,y)=>R(y,x)) (7.4) 
It is not clear how such statements could be captured in SemNet. One problem 
is that the statements appear to be untyped, secondly it is not clear what the 
definition of the subject and objects of any events should be. 
Starting from the formulation of the donkey sentence in TOVC and considering 
its counterpart in UTT: 
VxVy{F(x) A D(y) A 0{x, y)) B{x, y) 
Ux : F.Uy : D.O{x,y) -+ B(x,y) 
it is observed that this is isomorphic to: 
Ilz : (Ex : F.Zy : D.0{x,y))B{nl(z),irl(n2(z))) 
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(equivalent to the formulation given by Ranta, see section 3.6) from which 
types equivalent to F l and D l can be extracted. Following a similar pattern for 
equation 7.4 gives, R is symmetric i f and only if: 
Uf : ( E x : T.Ey : T . i2(x,y)) i2(7rl(7r2( / )) ,7r l( / )) 
From which subject and object concepts can be extracted as: 
X = Ex : T.Ey : T.R(x,y) 
Y = Ey : T.Ex : T.R(x,y) 
and the statement becomes2: 
Tlx : X.R{nl{x), 7rl(7r2(x))) (7.5) 
which can be converted to SemNet, as in figure 7.2 
Similarly the transitive statement gets converted to: 
11/ : (Ex : T.Sy : TXz : T.(R(x, y) A R(y, z)))R(nl(f), 7r2(7rl(/))) (7.6) 
from which the following relevant types can be extracted: 
X = Ex : T.Ey : T.Ez : T.(R(x, y) A R{y, zj) 
Y = Ey : T.Ex : T.Ez : T.(R{x, y) A R(y, z)) 
Z = Ez : T.Ey : T . E x : T.(R(x,y) A R(y,z)) 
A problem here is that each of these types is defined by a conjunction of rela-
2The implicit subtyping assumed in chapter 6, avoided the use of the projection functions 













Figure 7.2: Proposed SemNet structure for Symmetric action 
tions, leading to the graph in figure 7.3. Here E3 is the defining event for each of 
the entity concepts X, Y and Z, but E3 is not directly connected to any of them. 
Therefore i f SemNet is to represent transitive relations (actions) in this way some 
extension to the representation is needed. 
7.3 Necessary statements 
Section 5.3 discussed how possible world semantics could be used to give a semantic 
account for 'necessarily true' statements. Here it is shown how the semantics 
defined so far can account for necessity. Consider again the nodes from figure 4.6. 
Xm = Ex : T.CS(x) A PF(x) 





FU sub obi FU ub 









Figure 7.3: Proposed SemNet structure for Transitive action 
where CS is a predicate for 'being a computer scientist at Durham', and PF is 
a predicate for 'plays football'. The events are interpreted as: 
Ex = Ux : Xm.PF{x) 
E2 = Ux: Xm.AI(x) 
where A I is a predicate for 'studies A I ' . The difference between these statements 
is that Ex is a tautology and so is a necessary truth. 
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7 o 4 Intensionality of Propositions 
As discussed in chapter 5, the intuitive interpretation for the epistemic actions 
is as relations over the domains of the subject and object. The problem there 
was that, propositions are only interpreted extensionally, i.e. as members of the 
set {true,false}. This time however, the initial semantics have mapped events to 
objects of type Prop in UTT. Therefore there is an intensional distinction between 
objects. For example: 
(Repi, Roberto, El) \-t Believes(Robertom, Elm) (7 7) 
(Repi, Roberto, E2) (->• Believes(Robertom, E2m) 
(with Believes : (T x Prop) —> Prop). This seems reasonable since Elm and 
E2m are distinct types (propositions). 
In this section rather than leaving the relation implicit (as was done with ordi-
nary actions) epistemic relations are defined explicitly as the inductive relation 3: 
Define a relation relation B, 




Yla : CI.He : wff[si].IR(EEspec(a, e,true)) —» B(am, e, 
Ila : CI.He : wff[s2].IR(EEinst(a, e, true)) —> B(am, e, 




EEvents are interpreted by a recursive function over this structure. 
3With am and em being the semantic counterparts of a and e. 
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•M-eevent EEspec(a, e, true) 
EEinst(a, e, true) 
EEbasic(a, e, true) 
EEspec(a, e, false) 
EEinst(a, e, false) 
EEbasic(a, e, false) 
EErec(a, e, true) 
EErec(a, e, false) 
— B(am^em) 
= B(am,em) 
— B(am, em) 
— ~nB(am) Cm) 
= ->B(am,em) 
= -<B(am, e m ) 
= B(am,Meevent(e)) 
- ->B(am,Meevent{e)) 
The 'complexity measure function' w : EEvent —> not is easily defined on the 
structure of EEvent. 
w EEspec = zero 
w EEinst = zero 
w EEbasic = zero 
w EErec(a,e,bb) suc(w(e)) 
Chapter 7: Formal type theoretic semantics 132 
Intuitive Example 
For example, consider the events: 
E l (Likes,Man,U,Dog,U) 
E2 (Roberto <= Man) 
E3 (Likes,true,Roberto,I,Dog,U) 
E4 (R e p t-,Rick,El) 
E5 (R e p t,Rick,E2) 
with interpretations: 
Al l men like all dogs. 
Roberto is a man. 
Roberto likes all dogs. 
Rick believes 'all men like all dogs'. 
Rick believes 'Roberto is a man'. 
Elm = Ux : Manm.Ily : Dogm.Likesm(x,y) 
E2m = Manpred{Robertom) 
E3m = Ux : Dogm.Likes(Robertom,y) 
E4m = B(Rickm,Elm) 
E5m = B(Rickm, E2m) 
Operationally the rules of 7i2[s4] entail the event: 
E6 (R e pi,Rick,E3) Rick believes 'Roberto likes all dogs', 
and so by definition semantically the proposition: 
is entailed. 
This may seem like the problem of semantics has been avoided, and that ' t ruth ' 
has been directly equated with proof. To a certain extent this is the case. However 
some advantages have been accrued. In fact the interpretation reflects the semantics 
of epistemic events directly, since the true (operational) semantics of epistemic 
events is defined by the inference rules. By 'shifting' these rules into the world of 
'Prop' in UTT, the 'meaning' can be analysed in terms of formal logical propositions 
of UTT. This is done in two phases, first a description of the current rules is given, 
and then an analysis of richer epistemic statements is given. 
E6m = B(Rickm, E3m) (7.8) 
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7.4.1 Definitional Events are Distinguished 
It has already been established that the interpretation distinguishes interpretations 
for different events, see equation 7.7. In fact the distinction is finer grained than 
might be expected as even the definitional events (which are all tautologies) are 
distinguished. 
For example, consider the interpretations for E l in equation 7.1 and for E2 in 
the following: 









Figure 7.4: Definitional Event, 'Men that like bikes'. 
E2 ^ I 
The statement: IIx : M\m3y : Bm.Lm(x,y) 
Every M l likes a bike. 
defining M l m as: Ex : M m . £ y : Bm.Lm(x,y) 
Men that like a bike. 
defining B l m as: Ex : B.Ex : Mm.Lm(x,y) 
Bikes liked by a man. 
The statement E2 is proved by an object such as: 
Ax : Ml m .L m (x , 7r l (7 r2 (x ) ) ) 
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This is a different object from a proof of E l , thus showing that E l and E2 are 
different types. 
7.4.2 Semantic analysis of Epistemic Rules 
The intuition behind the basic epistemic rules, is that they assume all agents are 
able to use all the rules of inference known to LOLITA. Since these rules have been 
shown to be sound with respect to type theory, the assumption seems reasonable. 
The more general rules involving internal relationships of B are open to analysis. 
For example, rule 4.12 (corresponding to ir\2) is interpreted as: 
This rule is harder to state in possible worlds semantics (see 5.3.2), but, because 
of the impredicativity of Prop, it can be made directly in UTT. 
Finally rule 4.13 (corresponding to irlS) is interpreted as: 
This rule translated as something that is true (provable) in PWS. It is inter-
esting that this proposition is not provable in UTT (from the rules given). This 
means that there is the flexibility in this model of allowing inconsistent agents, i.e. 
for some agent a, and some event e LOLITA could believe: 
UP : Prop.Ua : T.B(a, P) -> B(a, B(a, P)) (7.9) 
UP : Prop.Ua : T.B(a,^P) - 5 ( a , P ) (7.10) 
B(am,e. m ) A B(am,^e m 
without her own beliefs being inconsistent. Its not clear if this is directly ap-
plicable, but it is certainly true that many agents express contradictory utterances 
and beliefs, and so in the longer term it may be useful to give a semantic account 
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of this behaviour. 
7.4.3 Design/Prescription for Epistemic events 
The current implementation of SemNet treats all epistemic actions in the same way. 
Intuitively there are some relationships which can be made between the actions. 
For example, if you know a fact, then you presumably believe that fact, although 
the converse may not hold, i.e. 
Ua : T.UP : Prop.Knows(a, P) -> Believes(a, P) 
this corresponds to an epistemic action hierarchy shown in figure 7.5. 




Figure 7.5: Epistemic Action Hierarchy. 
Other expressions which are easily stated in the semantics include: 
Simon believes everything that Donna believes, 
which is stated as: 
UP : Prop.B(Donna,P) -t B(Simon,P) 
This time the counterpart in SemNet is not so obvious as there is no mechanism 
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for treating events as parameters. However, the semantics are in place for such a 
structure. 
7.4.4 Impredicativity and Paradox 
The danger/difficulty of treating events as parameters, especially when impred-
icativity has been allowed into the language, are paradoxes. It is perhaps worth 
noting that (seemingly) paradoxical statements such as: 
"This statement is not true." 
which are discussed extensively in [Barwise and Etchemendy, 1987] cannot be 
stated in SemNet. This is because the recursive epistemic events (i.e. statements 
of belief about belief) are all grounded by basic epistemic events. 
7.5 Distributedness. 
Distributedness of SemNet (with respect to the set theoretic model) was established 
in section 5.4. In this section rather than giving a fu l l analysis (which would mostly 
repeat points already made) an interpretation of the 'syntactic arcs' of sections 6.4 
and 6.5 are given. It is clear that the interpretation of each arc is 'sound' with 
respect to the fu l l event and so to the ful l net. 
It is assumed (to save space) that quantifications are stored on the events rather 
than on the arcs and for the basic events the values are only given for Eue events. 
The result for basic events is similar to those for set theoretic semantics, however, 
because of the similarity in structure between epistemic events and their semantics 
the results for epistemic events are much clearer. 
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Munk '• Link —> Prop 
Munk {Subject, Eue, A) = 3R! : (T2 -»• Prop).Ex : Am. 
3y:T.R'{x,y) 
M H n k {Object, Eue, B) = 3R' : ( T 2 Prop)3X : Type.Ux : X. 
3y : Bm.R'{x,y) 
Munk {Action, Eue, R) = 3X,Y : T.Ilx : X3y : Y. 
R{x,y) 
with X and Y subtypes of T. For epistemic links: 
Mepiink '• EpLink —> Prop 
Mepiink {EpSubject{E,a)) = 3P : Prop.B{am, P) 
Mepiink {EpObject{E, e)) = 3a : T.B{a, em) 
Mepiink {EpAbject{E, Repi)) = 3P : Prop.3a : T.B{a, P) 
This shows that SemNet is distributed with respect to the type theoretic model. 
7.5.1 What makes SemNet distributed 
As discussed in chapter 1 semantic nets have been described as notational variants 
of set theory or classical logic [Schubert, 1991]. It is usually accepted that they are 
organised so that commonly used inferences can be performed efficiently. In section 
4.8 it was claimed that SemNet went further, in being designed to be distributed 
it is organised so as to be flexible and robust for NLE in ways that classical logic 
cannot be. Having defined and formally analysed distributedness, this section looks 
for aspects of the representation that make it distributed. 
UTT (like classical logic) is only distributed as far as separate statements. The 
method will be to look at UTT interpretations of SemNet structures and to consider 
whether statements of these forms are somehow more distributed than other UTT 
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statements. 
Consider the events of this chapter and their type theoretic interpretations, i.e. 
equations 7.1, 7.2, 7.5 and 7.8: 
Tlx : Flm.3y : Dlm.Om(x,y) 
Ux : Flm.Beats(x, f(x)) (/ : Flm -> D\m) 
Ux : (Ex : T.Ey : T.R(xty)).R{irl(x), (pil(pi2{x))) (f,g:X->T) 
B(am,Em) (Em : Prop) 
and considering the structures of interpretations for basic events, from equa-
tion 6.1: 
Ilx : Am.Uy : Bm.R 
m •£ y 
Tlx : Am.3y : Bm.R 
m % y 
Ux : Bm3y : Am.R 
m y ^ 
Uy : Bm.R 
m am y 
Ux : Am.R 
Rjn ®m bm 
Pre-Event forms 
The general pattern seems to mirror the intuition that SemNet builds complex con-
cepts and allows 'new' events to refer to these concepts, events. In each case there 
is a 'quantification structure' (from now on the prefix) where types are defined, 
and a 'statement structure' (from now on the matrix) which refers to objects built 
by the prefix. Each of the above statements are convertible to a type in pre-event 
form: 
Tlx : (Structure).R(f(x),g(x)) (7.11) 
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The question is whether statements in such a form are more distributed than 
general UTT statements. 
The 'matrix' of 7.11 can be read independently from the prefix. I t states that 
two things are in the relationship R. 
For example, the matrix of equation 7.1 states that some x 'Owns' some y but 
the types and quantifications of x and y are unknown without the prefix. 
The types and quantifications of the statement are implicit in the prefix. In 
SemNet the corresponding event specifies the types and quantifications locally. 
To mimic this, similar tagging mechanisms would be needed, e.g. add type and 
quantification tags to the referenced variable: 
\pr&flx'}R(f(x')quant,typei 9 {^) quant,type) 
for the example from equation 7.1 
Ux : Flm3y : Dm.Bm(xViFi,yEtD) 
This extra tagging is not needed for distributedness, as the matrix can be read 
independently anyway. However, there is value in adding the tags as this makes 
the interpretation more useful. 
The 'prefix' consists of type judgements and quantifications. It defines types in 
terms of other types and event structures. I t can be read independently from the 
matrix, but it makes no statement. 
For example, the prefix of equation 7.5, defines the structure required to make 
the statement, irl(x) defines those objects that are the subject of a relation R, and 
7rl(7r2(a;)) defines those objects which are the object of a relation R 
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Coverage of Pre-Event Forms 
Pre-event forms may seem restricted to statements involving binary relations, and 
these relations being restricted to types 'below' T in the subtype hierarchy. How-
ever, it does not seem difficult to widen the definition of an event to allow for as 
many (labelled) arcs as are required, thus being interpreted as n-ary relations (for 
any n). Also in theory the types need not be drawn from the entity hierarchy, 
indeed the epistemic relations have already shown that they can be proposition 
types as well. 
The main aspect missing from general UTT statements are the logical connec-
tives. But then these will clearly interpret the logical connective events of SemNet. 
It is not claimed here that all statements in pre-event form have a counterpart 
in SemNet. Indeed the statement for transitivity is of this form and yet because of 
the problem of defining concepts via a 'conjunction' event, it is not clear how the 
current SemNet should represent i t . 
7.6 Review 
This chapter has focussed on how features of UTT have been exploited to model 
and understand SemNet semantically. This has been shown in four distinct areas: 
1. The sigma type has been used to allow a mimicking of the strong existential 
quantification which seems to be assumed in the representation of the 'donkey 
sentence'. 
2. The intensionality of types has been exploited to show how intensional aspects 
of entity concepts can be distinguished. 
3. The intensionality of propositions has been used to model the epistemic rea-
soning of SemNet. 
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4. Sigma types have been used to model how SemNet builds up and re-uses 
complex concepts. 
Chapter 
Evaluation^ Conclusion and 
Further work 
This chapter begins with an evaluation of the project based on the original ob-
jectives. A conclusion section is given and finally some suggestions for further 
work. 
8.1 Evaluation 
This evaluation section is structured to fit the methodological success and project 
specific criteria described in chapter 1. 
8.1.1 The semantic model 
A type theoretic semantic model has been built. Each of the basic constructs 
of SemNet have an interpretation in UTT. The success of the project rests on 
how closely the model fits the subjective 'intuitions' of the meaning of SemNet 
constructs. As was pointed out in chapter 1, this is almost as difficult as trying to 
establish an agreed semantics for natural language, nevertheless a crude analysis is 
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attempted. 
Basic events 
The interpretation of the basic events seems entirely reasonable as an interpretation 
for their natural language counterparts. The examples below show each of the event 
types, a natural language statement that would be represented by such an event, 
and the type theoretic semantics for the event. Each type theoretic statement 
seems a reasonable interpretation. 
Eui There is a toy that every child likes. 3y : T.Hx : C.L(x,y) 
Eii There is a child that likes all toys. 3a: : C.Hy : T.L(x,y) 
Where C, T, L are the obvious counterparts/types for children, toys and liking. 
As outlined in 7.1 there are arguments for suggesting that these interpretations 
capture the English statements more intuitively than their set theoretic counter-
parts since the quantifications are over the concepts involved, rather than over a 
universe. 
The hierarchy 
There can be little argument that the developers of LOLITA consider the entity 
hierarchy as a subset and membership hierarchy. However, the subtype hierarchy 
can be viewed as a subset hierarchy (over the type T of chapter 6, as opposed to 
the set theoretic domain V of chapter 5) except that the 'sets' lower down the 
hierarchy are paired with properties which they hold. In this sense it can be seen 
that the underlying semantics are the same, it is just that more structure is added 
Euu 
Eue 
Al l children like all toys. 
Every child likes a toy. 
n.T : C.Ily:T.L(x,y) 
llx : C.3y:T.L(x,y) 
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to the concepts lower down the hierarchy. With this proviso the subtype hierarchy 
meets the developers' intuitions. 
Meaning as location. 
A major principle of SemNet is that no nodes have a pre-defined meaning and 
the meaning of a node depends on how it is related to the other nodes, i.e. on 
its location. Moreover, the ful l meaning of a node can only be determined by 
interpreting the whole network. 
In type theory an entity node A, is interpreted as a type: 
Am = : T.P(x) 
where P is a predicate over T. This is a partial interpretation, as P is implicit, 
to interpret more (find out more about P) the defining event must be interpreted 
(as Epred), giving: 
Ux : T.(Epred x A Pi x) 
where Pi is an implicit predicate over T, which is defined by the nodes 'above' A 
in the hierarchy. Again this is only partial and to interpret more involves interpret-
ing the defining events for the generalisations of the original node. A fu l l definition 
is reached once the top entity node is reached. A similar analysis could be per-
formed for events, which require their subject and object nodes to be interpreted 
fully before they are fully defined. 
The idea of meaning as location is certainly captured by the semantics. A 
local interpretation is possible, and this can be built upon by reading more nodes. 
However, not all the nodes are required to reach a fu l l interpretation. Observed 
events (if introduced) and nodes 'below' an entity in the hierarchy do not seem to 
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be required. For example, the interpretation of the node for M A M M A L is not used 
at all to define the type for ANIMAL. This seems reasonable, unless it is insisted 
that a part of the meaning of A N I M A L is that some of them are MAMMALs. 
Complex Concepts 
Intuitively SemNet builds complex statements by building up complex concepts 
(nodes) through defining events and allowing new events to refer to them. The 
type theoretic semantics models this with all interpretations being in pre-event 
form (see equation 7.11). 
Furthermore, in representing the 'donkey sentence' SemNet assumes that the 
witness of a previous existential can be extracted. Constructive type theory models 
this directly, and as discussed in 7.2, this leads to a statement that is isomorphic 
to Ranta's interpretation of the 'donkey sentence'. 
Belief as a relation 
Intuitively actions are relations over the subject and object of the event. This 
is also true for epistemic events. This is modelled directly in type theory by the 
inductively defined relation B : (T x Prop) -> Prop. 
Moreover, the rules of inference are reflected directly in B, since B is defined 
by them. Therefore, in this case even if B does not reflect intuitions, it does reflect 
directly the meaning of epistemic events. 
Summary 
The above analysis shows, intuitively, that the model reflects SemNet. However, 
simply mapping to a type theoretic model does not ensure that SemNet is well 
founded in any sense. This can only be established by analysing the model in 
terms of the logic of type theory. 
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Of course it is also intuitive that SemNet meets many of the properties described 
and so showing this in the semantics model adds further verification that the model 
captures the intuitive SemNet. 
8.1.2 Correctness of Reasoning 
The 'valid' inference rules have been interpreted into type theory and shown to be 
sound. 
There is the added element that the proofs have been machine assisted checked. 
Furthermore, an abstraction of the algorithm for implementing inheritance has been 
shown to implement rules 4.1 and 4.2 soundly and completely. 
8.1.3 Expressiveness 
The three aspects of SemNet related to expressiveness that were analysed were 
rich quantification, epistemic knowledge and intensionality. These have all been 
analysed as follows. 
The analysis of the 'donkey sentence' representation (see section 7.2) shows 
that SemNet can express the quantification needed here. In particular the whole 
sentence is represented, but also all the substructures involved represent statements 
that are entailed by the fu l l sentence. 
The analysis of epistemic actions showed that the rules used are reasonable 
(when considered in the impredicative world of Prop). 
The analysis of entities showed that although the inheritance works extension-
ally, the structure does contain the information to make intensional distinctions. 
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8.1.4 Flexibility 
In chapter 4 distributedness was put forward as a reasonable measure of how flexible 
a network is. To show SemNet is distributed required a formal semantic model, 
and this was completed for both models developed. 
Essentially distributedness shows that information can be gleaned at various 
levels of granularity. The point is that different algorithms have the flexibility 
to choose the 'depth' of information that they require right down to the level of 
individual nodes and arcs. 
8.1.5 Developer Comprehend-ability 
The project has contributed to developer comprehend-ability. As discussed from 
the beginning it should be emphasised that the exposition given of SemNet in 
chapter 4 was not a starting point for the thesis. The presentation given and issues 
raised were mainly the result of the semantic analysis presented in later chapters. 
For a newcomer to the project chapter 4 serves as the best way to understand, 
intuitively how SemNet operates. When a developer is writing algorithms that 
operate on SemNet they should now use the formal semantics developed in chapter 
6, as the intended meaning of the constructs. 
For example, in semantic analysis when deciding whether a concept exists al-
ready, the verification should be considered in relation to the semantics of the nodes 
concerned. 
8.1.6 Issues for SemNet. 
The main issues raised by the work were outlined in section 4.5. The semantic 
model may contribute further, by providing a semantic basis for decisions. Of 
course all decisions will have to be weighed up against engineering principles such 
as cost-benefit, resource constraints and so on. 
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• Semantic analysis (see section 7.2) has shown that it is equally meaningful to 
place the quantification tags on the links, entities or events of SemNet, but 
that each effects interpretation efficiency. 
• The mapping of epistemic actions to a relation over Prop and T was so 
successful that it is easy to consider extensions to the epistemic reasoning 
module in the semantics (see section 7.4). 
8.1.7 Contribution to N L E . 
The main contribution to NLE has been to give a formal presentation for SemNet, 
which is an extremely powerful KR language. This meets the criticism discussed 
in chapter 2, that semantic networks are often presented informally with unclear 
semantics. 
Secondary to this is that type theory has many features that are extremely 
useful for formalisation work in NLE. In this section an evaluation of this claim is 
given. 
Semantic Similarities 
Many of the a priori reasons for using UTT as a semantic language for SemNet were 
because of similarities in structure between these two specific languages. Whether 
the work is relevant to other networks rests on how similar SemNet is to other 
networks. 
The model of the hierarchy is of the most general interest. In both KL-ONE 
and CGT concepts lower down the hierarchy are defined by the 'parent' nodes and 
by the roles they play. In CGT these roles are defined by lambda abstractions. By 
defining the nodes as types this captures this definition precisely. 
The notion of defined and observed events is actually very similar to the tax-
onomy and assertion distinctions of KL-ONE type systems. This suggests that 
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the section modelling building and re-use of concepts may be applicable to these 
networks. 
As discussed in section 4.8.2, SNePS represents the 'donkey sentence' in a man-
ner very similar to SemNet. By re-referring to the variable 'donkeys owned by 
a farmer' and claiming the graph represents the donkey sentence, then a witness 
extracting function is being assumed. Therefore the constructive interpretation 
provided by UTT is ideal for capturing this. 
Also relevant to the SNePS representation is the interpretation of event nodes 
as objects of type Prop in UTT. This allowed for example, an interpretation for 
the recursive nesting of propositions. 
The work of Ranta [Ranta, 1994] shows that many aspects of natural language 
can be treated naturally in constructive type theory. This work found similarities 
between results there and how SemNet operated. Since other networks have been 
designed with natural language understanding in mind these similarities should 
manifest themselves here as well. 
Manageability aspects 
Performing a large analysis such as this is a major task. Type theory through its 
'manageability' features provided many tools and methods which helped to break 
the task down. 
The abstract theory mechanism helped to bring a modular approach to the 
problem. In this work it was fortunate that the hierarchy was entirely independent 
of the basic events, and that they in turn independent of the epistemic events. 
Otherwise the results achieved for SemNeti in section 6.2 would have to be re-
analysed when basic events were considered. But in the end this just helped in 
the presentation (i.e. chapter 6, could present the model of SemNet in distinct 
phases). The modular approach would still have helped to establish some results 
for the hierarchy before seeing how 'basic events' effected their behaviour. 
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Machine assistance was occasionally useful. Lego did stop some analysis from 
going further and demanded closer inspections, of course this generally occured 
when some aspect had been overlooked. 
8.2 Conclusions 
As has been stated the major result of this work is the provision of a formal 
semantics for SemNet. This is significant as many networks are put forward without 
proper regard for a formal account of meaning. The work has shown, formally, that 
SemNet has many features which help overcome some of the problems of KR for 
NLE. In particular: 
• SemNet is richly expressive, being able to represent intension, epistemic 
knowledge and complex quantification. 
• SemNet's basic reasoning mechanisms are sound with respect to the internal 
logic of UTT. 
• SemNet is distributed. This means that 'knowledge' can be retrieved in 
a flexible manner, as is required by the different modules of a large-scale 
natural language system. 
The work has also shown that constructive type theory has many features which 
make it a useful tool for studying aspects of NLE. For example: 
• It can express many aspects of natural language in a natural manner. More-
over, these are the same aspects that are often expressed in semantic networks 
(or more generally KR's for NLE). 
• It has useful meta-theoretic properties which have lead to tools and techniques 
developed for formal methods. These tools are useful for NLE. 
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The work has also characterised aspects of SemNet which are of more general 
interest to the semantic network community, in particular formally interpreting 
nodes in hierarchies as 'intensional' types, a constructive witness extracting func-
tion, and a direct interpretation for representing nodes as propositions. 
8.3 Further Work 
8.3.1 Implementing a Maths Vernacular 
A research proposal has been written [Luo et ai, 1996] and accepted to implement 
a mathematical vernacular. The idea is to integrate theory and technology in 
Computer-Assisted Formal Reasoning (CAFR) and Natural Language Processing. 
More specifically the project will attempt to provide type theoretic semantics for 
a 'subset' of natural language (i.e. the mathematical vernacular). This semantics 
wil l then be the focal point for linking the work of Lego (which is based on type 
theory) and LOLITA (which now has a type theoretic semantics). The longer term 
aim is to provide natural language support and capability to CAFR technology. 
Although this work will not feed this project directly, (as i t provides a for-
malisation of SemNet itself, rather than the knowledge it represents), it was the 
original motivation, and it is expected that a great deal of the modelling work will 
be re-usable for the 'linking' work. 
8.3.2 Further aspects of SemNet 
The original aim for this work was to better understand how SemNet represents 
and reasons with knowledge. The foundation for this is in place, and the basic 
mechanisms have been interpreted and understood. Two modules which build on 
the basic model are 'the reasoning by analogy module' and 'reasoning about time 
and location module'. A possible further project could consider these modules and 
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what their operations 'mean' in the type theoretic model 
8.3.3 The semantic model as a tool 
Finally, it has been mentioned that the semantic model has raised some issues for 
SemNet, and also that i t has a role to play in the future development of SemNet 
and LOLITA. To ensure this happens there is further work to be done, working 
out how the model could best be communicated, stored and updated so that it 
performs this role in the future. 
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